Myanmar army uniform

Myanmar army uniform DEFAULT

Myanmar protesters burn army uniform five months after coup

July 1 (Reuters) - Hundreds of protesters took to the streets of Myanmar's biggest city Yangon on Thursday, setting fire to an army uniform and chanting calls for democracy five months after a military coup ousted elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The protest was one of the biggest in Yangon in recent weeks, although demonstrations against the army take place daily in many parts of the Southeast Asian country.

"What do we want? Democracy! Democracy!" protesters chanted as they ran through the streets with colourful smoke flares.

"For the people! For the people," they shouted, according to video published by Reuters.

They set an army uniform ablaze before dispersing.

Demonstrators march on a street during a protest in Yangon, Myanmar July 1, , in this screen grab taken from a video obtained by Reuters.

Reuters was not immediately able to reach a military spokesman for comment.

Myanmar's army has struggled to impose its authority since taking power on Feb. 1. It has faced protests, strikes that have paralysed public and private sectors and a resurgence of conflicts in the borderlands.

The military authorities have branded their opponents terrorists. On Wednesday it freed more than 2, prisoners, most them detained since the coup.

The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners activist group says more than 6, people have been arrested since the coup. It puts the death toll at more than , a number the military says is exaggerated.

The army says its takeover was in line with the constitution. It took power alleging fraud in a November election swept by Suu Kyi's party. The former electoral commission had dismissed its accusations.

Reporting by Reuters staff; Editing by Matthew Tostevin and Pravin Char

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Sours: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-protesters-burn-army-uniform-five-months-after-coup/

Tatmadaw

Armed forces of Myanmar

"Armed forces of Burma" and "Military of Burma" redirect here. For the country's historical armed forces, see Military history of Myanmar.

Tatmadaw
Flag of the Myanmar Armed Forces.svg

Flag of the Tatmadaw

Service branches&#;Army
&#;Navy
&#;Air Force
&#;Police Force
HeadquartersNaypyidaw, Myanmar
Websitewww.mod.gov.mm
PresidentMyint Swe
Minister of DefenceGeneral Mya Tun Oo
Commander-in-ChiefSenior General Min Aung Hlaing
Deputy Commander-in-ChiefVice-Senior General Soe Win
Military&#;age18 years of age
Available for
military service
14,,&#;males, age&#;15–49 ( est.),
14,,&#;females, age&#;15–49 ( est.)
Fit for
military service
10,,&#;males, age&#;15–49 ( est.),
11,,&#;females, age&#;15–49 ( est.)
Reaching military
age annually
, males ( est.),
,&#;females ( est.)
Active personnel, ()
(, army,[1] 19, navy and 23, air force.[2]) (ranked 11th)
Reserve personnel18,
(23 battalions of Border Guard Force, BGF ( personnel),[3] 46 groups of People's Militia Group, PMG and Regional People's Militia Groups, RPMG ( personnel)[3] five corps of university Training Corp, UTC ( personnel)[4])
Budget$ billion[5] ()
Percent of GDP4% ()
Domestic suppliers
Foreign suppliers&#;China[7]
&#;India[7]
&#;Israel[7][8]
&#;North Korea[7]
&#;Philippines[7]
&#;Russia[7]
&#;Ukraine[7]
RanksMilitary ranks of Myanmar

Political party

The Tatmadaw (Burmese: တပ်မ​တော်; MLCTS: tap ma. taw, IPA:&#;[taʔmədɔ̀], lit.&#;'Armed Forces') is the official name of the armed forces of Myanmar (Burma). It is administered by the Ministry of Defence and composed of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Auxiliary services include the Myanmar Police Force, the Border Guard Forces and the People's Militia Units.[9]

Since independence, the Tatmadaw has faced significant ethnic insurgencies, especially in Kachin, Kayin, Kayah, and Shan states. General Ne Win took control of the country in a coup d'état, attempting to build an autarkic society called the Burmese Way to Socialism. Following the violent repression of nationwide protests in , the military agreed to free elections in , but ignored the resulting victory of the National League for Democracy and threw its leader Aung San Suu Kyi in prison.[10] The s also saw the escalation of the conflict between Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State due to RSO attacks on Tatmadaw forces.

In , the Tatmadaw again rewrote Myanmar's constitution, installing the pro-junta Union Solidarity and Development Party in elections boycotted by most opposition groups. Political reforms over the next half-decade culminated in a sweeping NLD victory in the election;[11] after the USDP lost another election in , the Tatmadaw annulled the election and deposed the civilian government. The Tatmadaw has been widely accused by international organizations of human rights offenses including ethnic cleansing,[12][13][14] torture, sexual assault and massacre of civilians.[12][15][16]

According to the Constitution of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw directly reports to the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) led by the President of Myanmar.[17] The NDSC is an eleven-member National Security Council responsible for security and defence affairs in Myanmar. The NDSC serves as the highest authority in the Government of Myanmar.

History[edit]

Main article: Military history of Myanmar

Burmese Monarchy[edit]

Main article: Royal Burmese armed forces

The Royal Armed Forces was the armed forces of the Burmese monarchy from the 9th to 19th centuries. It refers to the military forces of the Pagan Dynasty, the Ava Kingdom, the Toungoo Dynasty and the Konbaung Dynasty in chronological order. The army was one of the major armed forces of Southeast Asia until it was defeated by the British over a six-decade span in the 19th century.

The army was organised into a small standing army of a few thousand, which defended the capital and the palace, and a much larger conscription-based wartime army. Conscription was based on the ahmudan system, which required local chiefs to supply their predetermined quota of men from their jurisdiction on the basis of population in times of war. The wartime army also consisted of elephantry, cavalry, artillery and naval units.

Firearms, first introduced from China in the late 14th century, became integrated into strategy only gradually over many centuries. The first special musket and artillery units, equipped with Portuguese matchlocks and cannon, were formed in the 16th century. Outside the special firearm units, there was no formal training program for the regular conscripts, who were expected to have a basic knowledge of self-defence, and how to operate the musket on their own. As the technological gap between European powers widened in the 18th century, the army was dependent on Europeans' willingness to sell more sophisticated weaponry.

While the army had held its own against the armies of the kingdom's neighbours, its performance against more technologically advanced European armies deteriorated over time. While it defeated the Portuguese and French intrusions in the 17th and 18th centuries respectively, the army proved unable to match the military strength of the British Empire in the 19th century, losing the First, Second and Third Anglo-Burmese Wars. On 1 January , the Royal Burmese Army was formally disbanded by the British government.

British Burma (–)[edit]

Under British rule, the colonial government in Burma abstained from recruiting Burmese soldiers into the East India Company forces (and later the British Indian Army), instead relying on pre-existing Indian sepoys and NepaleseGurkhas to garrison the nascent colony. Due to mistrust of the Burmese population, the colonial government maintained this ban for decades, instead looking to the indigenous Karens, Kachins and Chins to form new military units in the colony. In , the colonial government overturned the ban, and Burmese troops started to enlist in small numbers in the British Indian Army.[18]

At the beginning of the First World War, the only Burmese military regiment in the British Indian Army, the 70th Burma Rifles, consisted of three battalions, made up of Karens, Kachins and Chins. During the conflict, the demands of war led to the colonial government relaxing the ban, raising a Burmese battalion in the 70th Burma Rifles, a Burmese company in the 85th Burma Rifles, and seven Burmese Mechanical Transport companies. In addition, three companies (combat units) of Burma Sappers and Miners, made up of mostly Burmese, and a company of Labour Corps, made up of Chins and Burmese, were also raised. All these units began their overseas assignment in The 70th Burma Rifles served in Egypt for garrison duties while the Burmese Labour Corps served in France. One company of Burma Sappers and Miners distinguished themselves in Mesopotamia at the crossing the Tigris.[19][20]

After the First World War, the colonial government stopped recruiting Burmese soldiers, and discharged all but one Burmese companies, which had been abolished by The last Burmese company of Burma Sappers and Miners too was disbanded in [19] Instead, Indian soldiers and other ethnic minorities were used as the primary colonial force in Burma, which was used to suppress ethnic Burmese rebellions such as the one led by Saya San from to On 1 April , Burma was made a separate colony, and Burmese were now eligible to join the army. But few Burmese bothered to join. Before World War II began, the British Burma Army consisted of Karen (%), Chin (%), Kachin (%), and Burmese %, without counting their British officer corps.[21]

In December , a group of Burmese independence activists founded the Burma Independence Army (BIA) with Japanese help. The Burma Independence Army led by Aung San (the father of Aung San Su Kyi) fought in the Burma Campaign on the side of the Imperial Japanese Army. Thousands of young men joined its ranks—reliable estimates range from 15, to 23, The great majority of the recruits were Burmese, with little ethnic minority representation. Many of the fresh recruits lacked discipline. At Myaungmya in the Irrawaddy delta, an ethnic war broke out between Burmese BIA men and Karens, with both sides responsible for massacres. The BIA was soon replaced with the Burma Defence Army, founded on 26 August with three thousand BIA veterans. The army became Burma National Army with Ne Win as its commander on 1 August when Burma achieved nominal independence. In late , it had a strength of approximately 15,[22]

Disillusioned by the Japanese occupation, the BNA switched sides, and joined the allied forces on 27 March

Post-independence[edit]

At the time of Myanmar's independence in , the Tatmadaw was weak, small and disunited. Cracks appeared along the lines of ethnic background, political affiliation, organisational origin and different services. The most serious problem was the tension between Karen Officers, coming from the British Burma Army and Burmese officers, coming from the Patriotic Burmese Force (PBF).[citation needed]

In accordance with the agreement reached at the Kandy Conference in September , the Tatmadaw was reorganised by incorporating the British Burma Army and the Patriotic Burmese Force. The officer corps shared by ex-PBF officers and officers from the British Burma Army and Army of Burma Reserve Organisation (ABRO). The colonial government also decided to form what were known as "Class Battalions" based on ethnicity. There were a total of 15 rifle battalions at the time of independence and four of them were made up of former members of PBF. None of the influential positions within the War Office and commands were manned with former PBF Officers. All services including military engineers, supply and transport, ordnance and medical services, Navy and Air Force were commanded by former Officers from ABRO and British Burma Army.[citation needed]

BattalionEthnic/Army Composition
No. 1 Burma RiflesBamar (Military Police + Members of Taungoo Guerilla group members associated with Aung San's PBF)
No. 2 Burma Rifles2 Karen Companies + 1 Chin Company and 1 Kachin Company
No. 3 Burma RiflesBamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – Commanded by then Major Kyaw Zaw BC
No. 4 Burma RiflesBamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – Commanded by the then Lieutenant ColonelNe Win BC
No. 5 Burma RiflesBamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – Commanded by then Lieutenant Colonel Zeya BC
No. 6 Burma RiflesFormed after Aung San was assassinated in later part of , Bamar / Former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – First CO was Lieutenant Colonel Zeya
No. 1 Karen RiflesKaren / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 2 Karen RiflesKaren / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 3 Karen RiflesKaren / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 1 Kachin RiflesKachin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 2 Kachin RiflesKachin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 1 Chin RiflesChin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 2 Chin RiflesChin / Former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 4 Burma RegimentGurkha
Chin Hill BattalionChin

The War Office was officially opened on 8 May under the Ministry of Defence and managed by a War Office Council chaired by the Minister of Defence.[citation needed] At the head of War Office was Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air Staff, Adjutant General and Quartermaster General. Vice Chief of Staff, who was also Chief of Army Staff and the head of General Staff Office. VCS oversee General Staff matters and there were three branch offices: GS-1 Operation and Training, GS-2 Staff Duty and Planning; GS-3 Intelligence. Signal Corps and Field Engineering Corps are also under the command of General Staff Office.[24]

According to the war establishment adopted on 14 April , Chief of Staff was under the War Office with the rank of major general. It was subsequently upgraded to a lieutenant general. Vice Chief of Staff was a brigadier general. The Chief of Staff was staffed with GSO-I with the rank of lieutenant colonel, three GSO-II with the rank of major, four GSO-III with the rank of captain for operation, training, planning and intelligence, and one Intelligence Officer (IO). The Chief of Staff office also had one GSO-II and one GSO-III for field engineering, and the Chief Signal Officer and a GSO-II for signal. Directorate of Signal and Directorate Field Engineering are also under General Staff Office.[24]

Under Adjutant General Office were Judge Advocate General, Military Secretary, and Vice Adjutant General. The Adjutant General (AG) was a brigadier general whereas the Judge Advocate General (JAG), Military Secretary (MS) and Vice Adjutant General (VAG) were colonels. VAG handles adjutant staff matters and there were also three branch offices; AG-1 planning, recruitment and transfer; AG-2 discipline, moral, welfare, and education; AG-3 salary, pension, and other financial matters. The Medical Corps and the Provost Marshal Office were under the Adjutant General Office.[24]

The Quarter Master General office also had three branch offices: QG-1 planning, procurement, and budget; QG-2 maintenance, construction, and cantonment; and QG-3 transportation. Under the QMG office were Garrison Engineering Corps, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps, Military Ordnance Corps, and the Supply and Transport Corps.[24]

Both AG and QMG office similar structure to the General Staff Office, but they only had three ASO-III and three QSO-III respectively.[24]

The Navy and Air Force were separate services under the War office but under the chief of staff.[24]

Reorganisation in [edit]

As per War Office order No. (9) on 28 September , the Chief of Staff became the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Army Staff became the Vice Chief of Staff (Army), the Chief of Naval Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Navy) and the Chief of Air Staff became the Vice Chief of Staff (Air).[citation needed]

On 1 January , the War Office was officially renamed as the Ministry of Defence. GeneralNe Win became the first Chief of Staff of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) to command all three services – Army, Navy and Air Force – under a single unified command for the first time.[citation needed]

Brigadier GeneralAung Gyi was given the post of Vice Chief of Staff (Army). Brigadier General D. A Blake became commander of South Burma Subdistrict Command (SBSD) and Brigadier General Kyaw Zaw, a member of the Thirty Comrades, became Commander of North Burma Subdistrict Command (NBSD).[citation needed]

Caretaker Government[edit]

Due to deteroriating political situations in , the then Prime minister of Burma, U Nu invited General Ne Win to form a "Caretaker Government" and handed over power on 28 October Under the stewardship of the Military Caretaker Government, parliamentary elections were held in February Several high-ranking and senior officers were dismissed due to their involvement and supporting various political parties.[26]

SerialName and RankCommandDateNotes
BCBrigadierAung ShweCommander, Southern Burma Sub-District Command13 February
BCBrigadier Maung MaungDirector of Directorate of Military Training / Commandant, National Defence College13 February
BCColonel Aye MaungNo. 2 Infantry Brigade13 February
BCColonel Tin MaungNo. 12 Infantry Brigade13 February
BCColonel Hla MawNo. 5 Infantry Brigade13 February Father of Thein Hla Maw
BCColonel Kyi WinNo. 7 Infantry Brigade8 March
BCColonel Thein ToteNo. 4 Infantry Brigade13 February
BCLieutenant Colonel Kyaw Myint23 June No. 10 Infantry Brigade // 13 February
BCLieutenant Colonel Chit KhaingDeputy Commandant, Combat Forces School13 February

Coup d'état[edit]

Main article: Burmese coup d'état

See also: Military rule in Myanmar

The elections of had put U Nu back as the Prime Minister and Pyidaungsu Party (Union Party) led civilian government resume control of the country.

On 2 March , the then Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, General Ne Win staged a coup d'état and formed the "Union Revolutionary Council".[28] Around midnight the troops began to move into Yangon to take up strategic position. Prime Minister U Nu and his cabinet ministers were taken into protective custody. At am, General Ne Win announced the coup over the radio. He said "I have to inform you, citizens of the Union that Armed Forces have taken over the responsibility and the task of keeping the country's safety, owing to the greatly deteriorating conditions of the Union." [29]

The country would be ruled by the military for the next 12 years. The Burma Socialist Programme Party became the sole political party and it the majority of its full members were military.[30] Government servants underwent military training and the Military Intelligence Service functioned as the secret police of the state.

Coup d'état[edit]

Main article: Uprising

At the height of the Four Eights Uprising against the socialist government, Former General Ne Win, who at the time was Chairman of the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), issued a warning against potential protestors during a televised speech. He stated that if the "disturbances" continued the "Army would have to be called and I would like to make it clear that if the Army shoots, it has no tradition of shooting into the Air, it would shoot straight to hit".[31]

Subsequently, the 22 Light Infantry Division, 33 Light Infantry Division and the 44 Light Infantry Division were redeployed to Yangon from front line fighting against ethnic insurgents in the Karen states. Battalions from three Light Infantry Divisions, augmented by infantry battalions under Yangon Regional Military Command and supporting units from Directorate of Artillery and Armour Corps were deployed during the suppression of protests in and around the then capital city of Yangon.

Initially, these troops were deployed in support of the then People's Police Force (now known as Myanmar Police Force) security battalions and to patrol the streets of the capital and to guard government offices and building. However, at midnight of 8 August troops from 22 Light Infantry Division guarding Yangon City Hall opened fire on unarmed protesters as the crack down against the protests began.

The armed forces under General Saw Maung formed a State Law and Order Restoration Council, repealed the constitution and declared martial law on 18 September By late September the military had complete control of the country.

Political reforms (–)[edit]

Following Myanmar's political reforms, Myanmar has made substantial shifts in its relations with major powers China, Russia and the United States.[32] In , Lieutenant-General Anthony Crutchfield, the deputy commander of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), was invited to address his counterparts at the Myanmar National Defence College in Naypyidaw, which trains colonels and other high-ranking military officers.[33] In May , Myanmar's Union Parliament approved a military cooperation agreement with Russia following a proposal by Deputy Minister of Defence.[34] In June , Myanmar and Russia signed a defence cooperation agreement.[35] The agreement will envisage exchanging information on international security issues, including fight against terrorism, cooperation in the sphere of culture and vacation of servicemen and their families, along with exchanging experience in peacekeeping activities.

Moreover, in response to Naypyidaw's post political and economic reforms, Australia re-established a ‘normal’ bilateral relationship with Myanmar to support democratisation and reform. In June , the Australian Federal Police signed a new Memorandum of Understanding with its Myanmar counterparts aimed at enhancing transnational crime cooperation and intelligence sharing.[36] In December , the US imposed sanctions on General Maung Maung Soe, a general of Western Myanmar Command who oversaw the military's crackdown in Rakhine State. The Tatmadaw had sentenced seven soldiers to year prison terms for killing 10 Rohingya men in Rakhine in September [37] A UN report revealed the degree to which the country's military uses its own businesses, foreign companies and arms deals to support, away from the public eye, a “brutal operations” against ethnic groups that constitute “serious crimes under international law”, bypassing civilian oversight and evading accountability.[38] In June , the Tatmadaw accused China for arming rebel groups in the country's frontier areas.[39]

coup d'état[edit]

Main article: Myanmar coup d'état

In February , the Tatmadaw detained Aung San Suu Kyi and other high-ranking politicians after a contested election with disputed results. A state of emergency had been declared for one year.[40]

Budget[edit]

According to an analysis of budgetary data between FY –12 and –19, approximately 13% to 14% of the national budget is devoted to the Burmese military.[41] However, the military budget remains opaque and subject to limited civilian scrutiny, and a Special Funds Law has enabled the Burmese military to circumvent parliamentary oversight to access supplemental funding.[42] Defence budgets were publicly shared for the first time in , and in recent years, parliamentary lawmakers have demanded greater transparency in military spending.[42][43]

The military also generates substantial revenue through 2 conglomerates, the Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC).[44] Revenues generated from these business interests have strengthened the Burmese military's autonomy from civilian oversight, and has contributed to the military's financial operations in "a wide array of international human rights and humanitarian law violations."[44] Revenues from MEHL and MEC are kept "off-book," enabling the military to autonomously finance military affairs with limited civilian oversight.[45]

Amnesty International says its investigations into Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) show Myanmar's military has received dividends of as much as $18bn from the Yangon-based company over the years. Its entire board is made up of senior military officials, it added.[46]

In the FY national budget, the military was allocated 3, billion kyats (approximately US$ billion).[47] In May , the Burmese parliament reduced the military's supplementary budgetary request by $ million.[48] On 28 October , the Minister for Defence Wai Lwin revealed at a Parliament section that % of the budget is spent on personnel cost, % on operation and procurement, % on construction related projects and % on health and education.[49]

Doctrine[edit]

Post-independence/civil war era (–)[edit]

The initial development of Burmese military doctrine post-independence was developed in the early s to cope with external threats from more powerful enemies with a strategy of Strategic Denial under conventional warfare. The perception of threats to state security was more external than internal threats. The internal threat to state security was managed through the use of a mixture of force and political persuasion. Lieutenant Colonel Maung Maung drew up defence doctrine based on conventional warfare concepts, with large infantrydivisions, armoured brigades, tanks and motorised war with mass mobilisation for the war effort being the important element of the doctrine.[50]

The objective was to contain the offensive of the invading forces at the border for at least three months, while waiting for the arrival of international forces, similar to the police action by international intervention forces under the directive of United Nations during the war on Korean peninsula. However, the conventional strategy under the concept of total war was undermined by the lack of appropriate command and control system, proper logistical support structure, sound economic bases and efficient civil defence organisations.[51]

Kuomintang invasion/Burma Socialist Programme Party era (–)[edit]

At the beginning of the s, while the Tatmadaw was able to reassert its control over most part of the country, Kuomintang (KMT) troops under General Li Mi, with support from the United States, invaded Burma and used the country's frontier as a springboard for attack against the People's Republic of China, which in turn became the external threat to state security and sovereignty of Burma. The first phase of the doctrine was tested for the first time in Operation "Naga Naing" in February against invading KMT forces. The doctrine did not take into account logistic and political support for KMT from the United States and as a result it failed to deliver its objectives and ended in a humiliating defeat for the Tatmadaw.[52]

The then Tatmadaw leadership argued that the excessive media coverage was partly to blame for the failure of Operation "Naga Naing". For example, Brigadier General Maung Maung pointed out that newspapers, such as the "Nation", carried reports detailing the training and troops positioning, even went as far to the name and social background of the commanders who are leading the operation thus losing the element of surprise. Colonel Saw Myint, who was second in command for the operation, also complained about the long lines of communications and the excessive pressure imposed upon the units for public relations activities to prove that the support of the people was behind the operation.[53]

Despite failure, the Tatmadaw continued to rely on this doctrine until the mids. The doctrine was under constant review and modifications throughout KMT invasion and gained success in anti-KMT operations in the mid and late s. However, this strategy became increasingly irrelevant and unsuitable in the late s as the insurgents and KMT changed their positional warfare strategy to hit and runguerrilla warfare.[54][55]

At the Tatmadaw's annual Commanding Officers (COs) conference, Colonel Kyi Win submitted a report outlining the requirement for new military doctrine and strategy. He stated that 'Tatmadaw did not have a clear strategy to cope with insurgents', even though most of Tatmadaw's commanders were guerrilla fighters during the anti-British and anti-Japanese campaigns during the Second World War, they had very little knowledge of anti-guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare. Based upon Colonel Kyi Win's report, the Tatmadaw began developing an appropriate military doctrine and strategy to meet the requirements of counterinsurgency warfare.

This second phase of the doctrine was to suppress insurgency with people's war and the perception of threats to state security was more of internal threats. During this phase, external linkage of internal problems and direct external threats were minimised by the foreign policy based on isolation. It was common view of the commanders that unless insurgency was suppressed, foreign interference would be highly probable,[56] therefore counterinsurgency became the core of the new military doctrine and strategy. Beginning in , the Directorate of Military Training took charge the research for national defence planning, military doctrine and strategy for both internal and external threats. This included reviews of international and domestic political situations, studies of the potential sources of conflicts, collection of information for strategic planning and defining the possible routes of foreign invasion.[57]

In , as part of new military doctrine planning, principles of anti-guerrilla warfare were outlined and counterinsurgency-training courses were delivered at the training schools. The new doctrine laid out three potential enemies and they are internal insurgents, historical enemies with roughly an equal strength (i.e. Thailand), and enemies with greater strength. It states that in suppressing insurgencies, Tatmadaw must be trained to conduct long-range penetration with a tactic of continuous search and destroy. Reconnaissance, Ambush and all weather day and night offensive and attack capabilities along with winning the hearts and minds of people are important parts of anti-guerrilla warfare. For countering an historical enemy with equal strength, Tatmadaw should fight a conventional warfare under total war strategy, without giving up an inch of its territory to the enemy. For powerful enemy and foreign invaders, Tatmadaw should engage in total people's war, with a special focus on guerrilla strategy.[58]

To prepare for the transition to the new doctrine, Brigadier GeneralSan Yu, the then Vice Chief of Staff (Army), sent a delegation led by Lieutenant Colonel Thura Tun Tin was sent to Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and East Germany in July to study organisation structure, armaments, training, territorial organisation and strategy of people's militias. A research team was also formed at General Staff Office within the War Office to study defence capabilities and militia formations of neighbouring countries.

The new doctrine of total people's war, and the strategy of anti-guerrilla warfare for counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare for foreign invasion, were designed to be appropriate for Burma. The doctrine flowed from the country's independent and active foreign policy, total people's defence policy, the nature of perceived threats, its geography and the regional environment, the size of its population in comparison with those of its neighbours, the relatively underdeveloped nature of its economy and its historical and political experiences.

The doctrine was based upon 'three totalities': population, time and space (du-thone-du) and 'four strengths': manpower, material, time and morale (Panama-lay-yat). The doctrine did not develop concepts of strategic denial or counter-offensive capabilities. It relied almost totally on irregular low-intensity warfare, such as its guerrilla strategy to counter any form of foreign invasion. The overall counterinsurgency strategy included not only elimination of insurgents and their support bases with the 'four cut' strategy, but also the building and designation of 'white area' and 'black area' as well.

In April , the Tatmadaw introduced special warfare training programmes at "Command Training Centres" at various regional commands. Anti-Guerrilla warfare tactics were taught at combat forces schools and other training establishments with special emphasis on ambush and counter-ambush, counterinsurgency weapons and tactics, individual battle initiative for tactical independence, commando tactics, and reconnaissance. Battalion size operations were also practised in the South West Regional Military Command area. The new military doctrine was formally endorsed and adopted at the first party congress of the BSPP in [citation needed] BSPP laid down directives for "complete annihilation of the insurgents as one of the tasks for national defence and state security" and called for "liquidation of insurgents through the strength of the working people as the immediate objective". This doctrine ensures the role of Tatmadaw at the heart of national policy making.

Throughout the BSPP era, the total people's war doctrine was solely applied in counterinsurgency operations, since Burma did not face any direct foreign invasion throughout the period. In , the then Lieutenant GeneralSaw Maung, Vice-Chief of Staff of Tatmadaw reminded his commanders during his speech at the Command and General Staff College:

In Myanmar, out of nearly 35 million people, the combined armed forces (army, navy and air force) are about two hundred thousand. In terms of percentage, that is about %. It is simply impossible to defend a country the size of ours with only this handful of troops therefore, what we have to do in the case of foreign invasion is to mobilise people in accordance with the "total people's war" doctrine. To defend our country from aggressors, the entire population must be involved in the war effort as the support of people dictate the outcome of the war.

SLORC/SPDC era (–)[edit]

See also: State Peace and Development Council

The third phase of doctrinal development of the Myanmar Armed Forces came after the military take over and formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September as part of the armed forces modernisation programme. The development was the reflection of sensitivity towards direct foreign invasion or invasion by proxy state during the turbulent years of the late s and early s, for example: the unauthorised presence of a US aircraft carrier Battle Group in Myanmar's territorial waters during the political uprising as evidence of an infringement of Myanmar's sovereignty. Also, the Tatmadaw leadership was concerned that foreign powers might arm the insurgents on the border to exploit the political situation and tensions in the country. This new threat perception, previously insignificant under the nation's isolationist foreign policy, led Tatmadaw leaders to review the defence capability and doctrine of the Tatmadaw.[59]

The third phase was to face the lower level external threats with a strategy of strategic denial under total people's defence concept. Current military leadership has successfully dealt with 17 major insurgent groups, whose 'return to legal fold' in the past decade has remarkably decreased the internal threats to state security, at least for the short and medium terms, even though threat perception of the possibility of external linkage to internal problems, perceived as being motivated by the continuing human rights violations, religious suppression and ethnic cleansing, remains high.[59]

Within the policy, the role of the Tatmadaw was defined as a `modern, strong and highly capable fighting force'. Since the day of independence, the Tatmadaw has been involved in restoring and maintaining internal security and suppressing insurgency. It was with this background that Tatmadaw's "multifaceted" defence policy was formulated and its military doctrine and strategy could be interpreted as defence-in-depth. It was influenced by a number of factors such as history, geography, culture, economy and sense of threats.[59]

The Tatmadaw has developed an 'active defence' strategy based on guerrilla warfare with limited conventional military capabilities, designed to cope with low intensity conflicts from external and internal foes, which threatens the security of the state. This strategy, revealed in joint services exercises, is built on a system of total people's defence, where the armed forces provide the first line of defence and the training and leadership of the nation in the matter of national defence.[59]

It is designed to deter potential aggressors by the knowledge that defeat of the Tatmadaw's regular forces in conventional warfare would be followed by persistent guerrilla warfare in the occupied areas by people militias and dispersed regular troops which would eventually wear down the invading forces, both physically and psychologically, and leave it vulnerable to a counter-offensive. If the conventional strategy of strategic denial fails, then the Tatmadaw and its auxiliary forces will follow Mao's strategic concepts of 'strategic defensive', 'strategic stalemate' and 'strategic offensive'.[59]

Over the past decade, through a series of modernisation programs, the Tatmadaw has developed and invested in better Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system; real-time intelligence; formidable air defence system; and early warning systems for its 'strategic denial' and 'total people's defence' doctrine.[59]

Organisational, command and control structure[edit]

Ambox current red.svg

This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(February )

Before [edit]

Overall command of Tatmadaw (armed forces) rested with the country's highest-ranking military officer, a general, who acted concurrently as Defence Minister and Chief of Staff of Defence Services. He thus exercised supreme operational control over all three services, under the direction of the President, State Council and Council of Ministers. There was also a National Security Council which acted in advisory capacity. The Defence Minister cum Chief-of-Staff of Defence Services exercised day-to-day control of the armed forces and assisted by three Vice-Chiefs of Staff, one each for the army, navy and air force. These officers also acted as Deputy Ministers of Defence and commanders of their respective Services. They were all based at Ministry of Defence (Kakweyay Wungyi Htana) in Rangoon/Yangon. It served as a government ministry as well as joint military operations headquarters.[60]

The Joint Staff within the Ministry of Defence consisted of three major branches, one each for Army, Navy and Air Force, along with a number of independent departments. The Army Office had three major departments; the General (G) Staff to oversee operations, the Adjutant General's (A) Staff administration and the Quartermaster General's (Q) Staff to handle logistics. The General Staff consisted two Bureaus of Special Operations (BSO), which were created in April and June respectively.[61]

These BSO are similar to "Army Groups" in Western armies, high level staff units formed to manage different theatres of military operations. They were responsible for the overall direction and co-ordination of the Regional Military Commands (RMC) with BSO-1 covering Northern Command (NC), North Eastern Command (NEC), North Western Command (NWC), Western Command (WC) and Eastern Command (EC). BSO-2 responsible for South Eastern Command (SEC), South Western Command (SWC), Western Command (WC) and Central Command (CC).[61]

The Army's elite mobile Light Infantry Divisions (LID) were managed separately under a staff colonel. Under G Staff, there were also a number of directorates which corresponded to the Army's functional corps, such as Intelligence, Signals, Training, Armour and Artillery. The A Staff was responsible for the Adjutant General, Directorate of Medical Services and the Provost Marshal's Office. The Q Staff included the Directorates of Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, and Military Engineers.

The Navy and Air Force Offices within the Ministry were headed by the Vice Chiefs of Staff for those Services. Each was supported by a staff officer at full colonel level. All these officers were responsible for the overall management of the various naval and air bases around the country, and the broader administrative functions such as recruitment and training.

Operational Command in the field was exercised through a framework of Regional Military Commands (RMC), the boundaries of which corresponded with the country's Seven States and Seven Divisions.[62] The Regional Military Commanders, all senior army officers, usually of Brigadier General rank, were responsible for the conduct of military operations in their respective RMC areas. Depending on the size of RMC and its operational requirements, Regional Military Commanders have at their disposal 10 or more infantry battalions (Kha La Ya).

to [edit]

The Tatmadaw command structure as of

The Tatmadaw's organisational and command structure dramatically changed after the military coup in In , the country's most senior army officer become a senior general (equivalent to field marshal rank in Western armies) and held the positions of chairman of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), Prime Minister and Defence Minister, as well as being appointed Commander in Chief of the Defence Services. He thus exercised both political and operational control over the entire country and armed forces.

From , each service has had its own Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff. The Army Commander in Chief is now elevated to full general (Bo gyoke Kyii) rank and also acted as deputy commander in Chief of the Defence Services. The C-in-C of the Air Force and Navy hold the equivalent of lieutenant general rank, while all three Service Chiefs of Staff were raised to major general level. Chiefs of Bureau of Special Operations (BSO), the heads of Q and A Staffs and the Director of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) were also elevated to lieutenant general rank. The reorganisation of the armed forces after resulted in the upgrading by two ranks of most of the senior positions.

A new command structure was introduced at the Ministry of Defence level in The most important position created is the Joint Chief of Staff (Army, Navy, Air Force) that commands commanders-in-chief of the Navy and the Air Force.

The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS, or Sit Maha Byuha Leilaryay Htana) was formed around and charged with formulating defence policies, and planning and doctrine of the Tatmadaw. The OSS was commanded by Lieutenant GeneralKhin Nyunt, who is also the Director of Defence Service Intelligence (DDSI). Regional Military Commands (RMC) and Light Infantry Divisions (LID) were also reorganised, and LIDs are now directly answerable to Commander in Chief of the Army.

A number of new subordinate command headquarters were formed in response to the growth and reorganisation of the Army. These include Regional Operation Commands (ROC, or Da Ka Sa), which are subordinate to RMCs, and Military Operations Commands (MOC, or Sa Ka Kha), which are equivalent to Western infantry divisions.

The Chief of Staff (Army) retained control of the Directorates of Signals, Directorate of Armour Corps, Directorate of Artillery Corps, Defence Industries, Security Printing, Public Relations and Psychological Warfare, and Military Engineering (field section), People's Militias and Border Troops, Directorate of Defence Services Computers (DDSC), the Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute.

Under the Adjutant General Office, there are three directorates: Medical Services, Resettlement, and Provost Martial. Under the Quartermaster General Office are the directorates of Military Engineering (garrison section), Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, and Electricaland Mechanical Engineering.

Other independent department within the Ministry of Defence are Judge Advocate General, Inspector General, Military Appointment General, Directorate of Procurement, Record Office, Central Military Accounting, and Camp Commandant.

All RMC Commander positions were raised to the level of major general and also serve as appointed chairmen of the state- and division-level Law and Order Restoration Committees. They were formally responsible for both military and civil administrative functions for their command areas. Also, three additional regional military commands were created. In early , a new RMC was formed in Burma's north west, facing India. In , the Eastern Command in Shan State was split into two RMCs, and South Eastern Command was divided to create a new RMC in country's far south coastal regions.[63]

In , the SLORC was abolished and the military government created the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The council includes all senior military officers and commanders of the RMCs. A new Ministry of Military Affairs was established and headed by a lieutenant general. This new ministry was abolished after its minister Lt. Gen. Tin Hla was sacked in

to [edit]

On 18 October , the OSS and DDSI were abolished during the purge of General Khin Nyunt and military intelligence units. OSS ordered 4 regiment to raid in DDSI Headquarter in Yangon. At the same time, all of the MIU in the whole country were raided and arrested by OSS corps. Nearly two thirds of MIU officers were detained for years. A new military intelligence unit called Military Affairs Security (MAS) was formed to take over the functions of the DDSI, but MAS units were much fewer than DDSI's and MAS was under control by local Division commander.

In early , a new Regional Military Command (RMC) was created at the newly formed administrative capital, Naypyidaw.

Tatmadaw Command Structure as of

Service branches[edit]

Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw Kyee)[edit]

Main article: Myanmar Army

Flag of the Myanmar Army.svg

The Myanmar Army has always been by far the largest service and has always received the lion's share of Burma's defence budget.[64][65] It has played the most prominent part in Burma's struggle against the 40 or more insurgent groups since and acquired a reputation as a tough and resourceful military force. In , it was described as "probably the best [army] in Southeast Asia, apart from Vietnam's".[66]

This judgment was echoed in , when another observer noted that "Myanmar's infantry is generally rated as one of the toughest, most combat seasoned in Southeast Asia".[67]

Myanmar Air Force (Tatmadaw Lay)[edit]

Main article: Myanmar Air Force

Flag of the Myanmar Air Force.svg

Personnel: 23, [68]

The Myanmar Air Force was formed on 16 January , while Myanmar (also known as Burma) was under British colonial rule. By , the new air force fleet included 40 Airspeed Oxfords, 16 de Havilland Tiger Moths, 4 Austers and 3 Supermarine Spitfires transferred from Royal Air Force with a few hundred personnel. The primary mission of Myanmar Air Force since its inception has been to provide transport, logistical, and close air support to Myanmar Army in counter-insurgency operations.

Myanmar Navy (Tatmadaw Yay)[edit]

Main article: Myanmar Navy

Naval Ensign of Myanmar.svg

The Myanmar Navy is the naval branch of the armed forces of Burma with estimated 19, men and women. The Myanmar Navy was formed in and, although very small, played an active part in Allied operations against the Japanese during the Second World War. The Myanmar Navy currently operates more than vessels. Before , the Myanmar Navy was small and its role in the many counterinsurgency operations was much less conspicuous than those of the army and air force. Yet the navy has always been, and remains, an important factor in Burma's security and it was dramatically expanded in recent years to a provide blue water capability and external threat defence role in Burma's territorial waters. Its personnel number 19, (including two naval infantry battalions).[69]

Myanmar Police Force (Myanmar Ye Tat Hpwe)[edit]

Main article: Myanmar Police Force

Myanmar Police Flag.svg

The Myanmar Police Force, formally known as The People's Police Force (Burmese: ပြည်သူ့ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့; MLCTS: Pyi Thu Yae Tup Pwe), was established in as independent department under the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was reorganised on 1 October and informally become part of Tatmadaw. Current Director General of Myanmar Police Force is Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Tun with its headquarters at Naypyidaw. Its command structure is based on established civil jurisdictions. Each of Burma's seven states and seven divisions has their own Police Forces with headquarters in the respective capital cities.[70]Israel and Australia often provide specialists to enhance the training of Burma's police.[71] Personnel: 72, (including 4, Combat/SWAT Police)

Rank structure[edit]

Main articles: Army ranks and insignia of Myanmar, Navy ranks and insignia of Myanmar, and Air Force ranks and insignia of Myanmar

Air Defence[edit]

Main article: Office of the Chief of Air Defence (Myanmar)

The Office of the chief of Air Defence (လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့အရာရှိချုပ်ရုံး) is one of the major branches of Tatmadaw. It was established as the Air Defence Command in but was not fully operational until late It was renamed the Bureau of Air Defence in the early s. In early s, Tatmadaw established the Myanmar Integrated Air Defence System (MIADS) (မြန်မာ့အလွှာစုံပေါင်းစပ်လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးစနစ်) with help from Russia, Ukraine and China. It is a tri-service bureau with units from all three branches of the armed forces. All air defence assets except anti-aircraft artillery are integrated into MIADS.[72]

Military intelligence[edit]

Main article: Military intelligence of Myanmar

Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs commonly referred to by its Burmese acronym Sa Ya Pha (စရဖ), is a branch of the Myanmar armed forces tasked with intelligence gathering. It was created to replace the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI), which was disbanded in

Defence industries[edit]

Main article: Myanmar Directorate of Defence Industries

The Myanmar Directorate of Defence Industries (DI) consists of 13 major factories throughout the country that produce approximately 70 major products for Army, Navy and Air Force. The main products include automatic rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, complete range of mortar and artillery ammunition, aircraft and anti aircraft ammunition, tank and anti-tank ammunition, bombs, grenades, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines such as the M14[73][74] pyrotechnics, commercial explosives and commercial products, and rockets and so forth. DI have produced new assault rifles and light machine-guns for the infantry. The MA series of weapons were designed to replace the old German-designed but locally manufactured Heckler & KochG3s and G4s that equipped Burma's army since the s.[75]

Political representation in Burma's parliament[edit]

  • 25% of the seats in both houses of the Burmese parliament are reserved for military appointees.

House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw)[edit]

House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw)[edit]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. – (3 February ). The Military Balance . London: Routledge. ISBN&#;.
  2. ^"Flightglobal - World Air Forces "(PDF). Flightglobal.com. Archived(PDF) from the original on 19 December Retrieved 15 June
  3. ^ ab"Border Guard Force Scheme". Myanmar Peace Monitor. 18 March [first published 11 January ].
  4. ^Maung Zaw (18 March ). "Taint of still lingers for rebooted student militia".
  5. ^"Myanmar declares USD billion defence budget for ". Archived from the original on 28 October Retrieved 29 November
  6. ^"Myanmar shipyard building 4th frigate".
  7. ^ abcdefg"7 countries still supplying arms to Myanmar military". Anadolu Agency. 5 August
  8. ^"Israel among 7 nations faulted in UN report for arming Myanmar army". Times of Israel. 5 August
  9. ^Buchanan, John (July ). "Militias in Myanmar"(PDF). The Asia Foundation. Archived(PDF) from the original on 3 August
  10. ^Wudunn, Sheryl; Times, Special To the New York (11 December ). "New 'Burmese Way' Relies On Slogans From the Military (Published )". The New York Times. ISSN&#; Retrieved 17 March
  11. ^"Myanmar's landmark elections explained". BBC News. 3 December Retrieved 17 March
  12. ^ ab"OHCHR &#; Myanmar: Tatmadaw leaders must be investigated for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes – UN report".
  13. ^"Myanmar's military accused of genocide in damning UN report". 27 August
  14. ^"U.N. Investigators Renew Call for Genocide Probe in Myanmar".
  15. ^"The World Isn't Prepared to Deal with Possible Genocide in Myanmar". 28 August
  16. ^"Tatmadaw Claims Killed Karen Community Leader Was a Plainclothes Fighter". 11 April
  17. ^"Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar"(PDF). Ministry of Information. September Retrieved 27 June
  18. ^Steinberg 37
  19. ^ abHack, Retig
  20. ^Dun
  21. ^Steinberg 29
  22. ^Seekins –
  23. ^Andrew Selth: Power Without Glory
  24. ^ abcdefMaung Aung Myoe: Building of Tatmadaw
  25. ^Maung Aung Myoe: Building the Tatmadaw
  26. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.
  27. ^Mya Win - Leaders of Tatmadaw
  28. ^Mya Win: Leaders of Tatmadaw
  29. ^Dr. Maung Maung: General Ne Win and Burma
  30. ^Martin Smith (). Burma – Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London and New Jersey: Zed Books.
  31. ^Dictator Ne Win threatening speech to the people in . Myanmar Radio and Television. 23 July
  32. ^hermes (22 April ). "Myanmar and major powers: shifts in ties with China, Russia and the US". The Straits Times. Retrieved 4 July
  33. ^"Opinion | How Should the US Engage Myanmar?". The Irrawaddy. 9 February Retrieved 4 July
  34. ^http://vov.vn/ (12 May ). "Myanmar parliament passes military cooperation plan with Russia". VOV – VOV Online Newspaper. Retrieved 4 July
  35. ^"Russia, Myanmar Sign Military Cooperation Agreement". www.defenseworld.net. Retrieved 4 July
  36. ^, corporateName=Commonwealth Parliament; address=Parliament House, Canberra, ACT, ; contact=+61 2 "Defence cooperation with Myanmar—Australia and other countries: a quick guide". www.aph.gov.au. Retrieved 4 July CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  37. ^"US House Backs Measures to Sanction Myanmar's Military, Nudge Gem Sector Reform". The Irrawaddy. 25 May Retrieved 4 July
  38. ^"Myanmar companies bankroll 'brutal operations' of military, independent UN experts claim in new report". 5 August
  39. ^"After ASEAN & India, Now Myanmar Accuses China Of Creating Trouble On The Border". EurAsian Times. Retrieved 16 July
  40. ^"Myanmar military takes control of country after detaining Aung San Suu Kyi". BBC. Retrieved 1 February
  41. ^"Analysis | Tracking the Myanmar Govt's Income Sources and Spending". The Irrawaddy. 22 October Retrieved 7 June
  42. ^ abHouse, Freedom (1 January ). "Freedom in the World – Myanmar". Freedom House. Retrieved 7 June
  43. ^"MP points out lack of details about defence spending". The Myanmar Times. 9 August Retrieved 7 June
  44. ^ ab"Economic interests of the Myanmar military". United Nations Human Rights Council. 16 September Retrieved 7 June
  45. ^McCarthy, Gerard (6 March ). MILITARY CAPITALISM IN MYANMAR: Examining the Origins, Continuities and Evolution of "Khaki Capital". ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. ISBN&#;.
  46. ^"Myanmar military gets billions from profitable business: Amnesty".
  47. ^"Spending on electricity tops budget for the first time". The Myanmar Times. 10 October Retrieved 7 June
  48. ^"Myanmar parliament cuts Defence Ministry budget by K billion". The Myanmar Times. 28 May Retrieved 7 June
  49. ^ဝင်းကိုကိုလတ် (28 October ). "စစ်ဆင်ရေးအတွက် ကန်ဒေါ်လာ ရှစ်ဘီလီယံသုံး". Mizzima (in Burmese). Archived from the original on 28 October Retrieved 28 October
  50. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.
  51. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.
  52. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.
  53. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.
  54. ^Aung San Thuriya Hla Thaung (Armanthit Sarpay, Yangon, )
  55. ^In Defiance of the Storm (Myawaddy Press, Yangon,
  56. ^Strategic Cultures in Asia-Pacific Region (St. Martin's Press)
  57. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.
  58. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.
  59. ^ abcdefAndrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces
  60. ^Andrew Selth: Transforming the Tatmadaw
  61. ^ abMaung Aung Myoe: Building the Tatmadaw, p
  62. ^See order of battle for further details
  63. ^see Order of Battle for further details
  64. ^Working Papers – Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU
  65. ^Andrew Selth: Power Without Glory
  66. ^Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 May
  67. ^Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July
  68. ^Myoe, Maung Aung: Building Tatmadaw
  69. ^Myoe, Maung Aung: Building the Tatmadaw
  70. ^http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/ministry/home/mpf/[permanent dead link]
  71. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.
  72. ^IndraStra Global Editorial Team (30 October ). "Myanmar Integrated Air Defense System". Archived from the original on 31 October Retrieved 7 December
  73. ^https://web.archive.org/web//http://www.karenhumanrightsgroup.org/photoreports/photos/gallery/section5.html. Archived from the original on 1 May Retrieved 2 November
  74. ^"Asia Times Online&#;:: Southeast Asia news – Myanmar, the world's landmine capital". Archived from the original on 29 December Retrieved 29 November CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
  75. ^Maung, Aung Myoe (). Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since . ISBN&#;.

Bibliography[edit]

  • Dun, Smith (). Memoirs of the Four-Foot Colonel, Volumes –. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University SEAP Publications. ISBN&#;.
  • Hack, Karl; Tobias Rettig (). Colonial armies in Southeast Asia (illustrated&#;ed.). Psychology Press. ISBN&#;.
  • Seekins, Donald M. (). Historical dictionary of Burma (Myanmar), vol. 59 of Asian/Oceanian historical dictionaries. 59 (Illustrated&#;ed.). Sacredcrow Press. ISBN&#;.
  • Steinberg, David I. (). Burma/Myanmar: what everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press. ISBN&#;.

External links[edit]

Sours: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tatmadaw
  1. Martial peak webnovel
  2. Bakugo full body
  3. Id cooling review

Capt. Tun Myat Aung leaned over the hot pavement in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, and picked up bullet casings. Nausea crept into his throat. The shells, he knew, meant that rifles had been used, real bullets fired at real people.

That night, in early March, he logged on to Facebook to discover that several civilians had been killed in Yangon by soldiers of the Tatmadaw, as Myanmar’s military is known. They were men in uniform, just like him.

Days later, the captain, of the 77th Light Infantry Division, notorious for its massacres of civilians across Myanmar, slipped off base and deserted. He is now in hiding.

“I love the military so much,” he said. “But the message I want to give my fellow soldiers is: If you are choosing between the country and the Tatmadaw, please choose the country.”

The Tatmadaw, which says it has a standing force of up to half a million men, is often portrayed as a robotic rank of warriors bred to kill. Since ousting Myanmar’s civilian leadership last month, setting off nationwide protests, it has only sharpened its savage reputation, killing more than people and assaulting, detaining or torturing thousands of others, according to a monitoring group.

On Saturday, the deadliest day since the Feb. 1 coup, security forces killed more than people, according to the United Nations. Among them were seven children, including two year-old boys and a 5-year-old boy.

In-depth interviews with four officers, two of whom have deserted since the coup, paint a complex picture of an institution that has thoroughly dominated Myanmar for six decades. From the moment they enter boot camp, Tatmadaw troops are taught that they are guardians of a country — and a religion — that will crumble without them.

Image

They occupy a privileged state within a state, in which soldiers live, work and socialize apart from the rest of society, imbibing an ideology that puts them far above the civilian population. The officers described being constantly monitored by their superiors, in barracks and on Facebook. A steady diet of propaganda feeds them notions of enemies at every corner, even on city streets.

The cumulative effect is a bunkered worldview, in which orders to kill unarmed civilians are to be followed without question. While the soldiers say there is some dissatisfaction with the coup, they regard a wholesale breaking of ranks as unlikely. That makes more bloodshed likely in the coming days and months.

“Most of the soldiers are brainwashed,” said a captain who is a graduate of the prestigious Defense Services Academy, Myanmar’s equivalent of West Point. Like two of the others who spoke with The New York Times, his name is not being published because of the possibility of retribution; he is still on active duty.

“I joined the Tatmadaw to protect the country, not to fight our own people,” he added. “I am so sad to see soldiers killing our own people.”

The Tatmadaw has been on a war footing since the country gained independence in , battling communist guerrillas, ethnic insurgencies and democracy advocates forced into the jungle after military crackdowns. In the cultlike confines of the Tatmadaw, the Buddhist Bamar ethnic majority is glorified at the expense of Myanmar’s many ethnic minorities, who have faced decades of military repression.

The enemy can also be within. A target of the Tatmadaw’s ire is Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the civilian leader deposed and locked up in last month’s coup. Her father, Gen. Aung San, founded the Tatmadaw.

Today, the Tatmadaw’s foes are again domestic, not foreign: the millions of people who have poured onto the streets for anti-coup rallies or taken part in strikes.

On Saturday, which was Armed Forces Day, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the commander in chief and instigator of the coup, gave a speech vowing to “protect people from all danger.” As tanks and goose-stepping soldiers paraded down the broad avenues of Naypyidaw, the bunker-filled capital built by an earlier junta, security forces shot protesters and bystanders alike, with more than 40 towns seeing violence.

“They see protesters as criminals because if someone disobeys or protests the military, they are criminal,” Captain Tun Myat Aung said. “Most soldiers have never tasted democracy for their whole lives. They are still living in the dark.”

Although the Tatmadaw shared some power with an elected government over the five years preceding the coup, it kept its grip on the country. It has its own conglomerates, banks, hospitals, schools, insurance agencies, stock options, mobile network and vegetable farms.

The military runs television stations, publishing houses and a film industry, with rousing offerings like “Happy Land of Heroes” and “One Love, One Hundred Wars.” There are Tatmadaw dance troupes, traditional music ensembles and advice columns admonishing women to dress modestly.

The vast majority of officers and their families live in military compounds, their every move monitored. Since the coup, most of them have not been able to leave those complexes for more than 15 minutes without permission.

“I would call this situation modern slavery,” said an officer who deserted after the coup. “We have to follow every order of our seniors. We cannot question if it was just or unjust.”

Officers’ children often marry other officers’ children, or the progeny of tycoons who have profited from their military connections. Often, foot soldiers breed the next generation of infantrymen. The ecosystem of the State Administration Council, as the junta that grabbed power last month calls itself, is a tangle of interconnected family trees.

Even during the five years of political opening, a quarter of the seats in Parliament were reserved for men in green. They didn’t mix with other lawmakers or vote as anything but a bloc. The most important government ministries remained in military hands.

“I am happy to be a servant to the people, but being in the military means being a servant to the leaders of the Tatmadaw,” said a military doctor in Yangon. “I want to quit, but I can’t. If I do, they will send me to prison. If I run away, they will torture my family members.”

The cloistered nature of the Tatmadaw may help to explain why its leadership underestimated the intensity of opposition to the putsch. Officers trained in psychological warfare regularly plant conspiracy theories about democracy in Facebook groups favored by soldiers, according to social media experts and one of the officers who spoke with The Times.

In this paranoid world, the thumping that Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy delivered to the military’s proxy party in last November’s elections was easily portrayed as electoral fraud.

A Muslim cabal, funded by oil-rich sheikhdoms, is accused of trying to destroy the Buddhist faith of Myanmar’s majority. Influential monks, who count army generals among those praying at their feet, preach that the Tatmadaw and Buddhist monkhood must unite to combat Islam.

In the Tatmadaw’s telling, a rapacious West could conquer Myanmar at any moment. Fear of invasion is thought to be one reason that military rulers moved the capital early in this century from Yangon, near the coast, to the landlocked plains of Naypyidaw.

“Now soldiers are killing people with the mind-set that they are protecting their nation from foreign intervention,” said the captain on active duty. His brigade is among those that have been deployed in a city to subdue an angry populace by force.

The feared invasion isn’t necessarily by plane or sea, but by the “black hand” of foreign influence. George Soros, the American philanthropist and democracy advocate, stands accused in Tatmadaw circles of trying to subvert the country with piles of cash for activists and politicians. A military spokesman implied during a news conference that people protesting the coup, too, were foreign-funded.

Captain Tun Myat Aung said that in his first year at the Defense Services Academy, he was shown a film that portrayed democracy activists in as frenzied animals slicing off soldiers’ heads. In truth, thousands of protesters and others were killed by the Tatmadaw that year.

One of Captain Tun Myat Aung’s men was recently struck in the eye by a projectile from a protester’s slingshot, he said. But the captain acknowledged that the casualties were remarkably lopsided in the other direction.

Tatmadaw Facebook feeds may show soldiers besieged by violent protesters armed with homemade firebombs. But it is the security forces who have assaulted medics, killed children and forced bystanders to crawl in obeisance.

According to the soldiers who spoke with The Times, a suspension of mobile data access over the past two weeks was aimed as much at isolating troops who were beginning to question their orders as it was at cutting off the wider population.

Shortly after the coup, a few soldiers expressed solidarity with the protesters on Facebook. “The military is losing. Don’t give up, people,” one captain, who is now in hiding, wrote on his Facebook feed. “The truth will win in the end.”

The Tatmadaw’s insularity serves another purpose. For decades, the military has been fighting multiple enemies on multiple fronts, mostly ethnic armed groups clamoring for autonomy. Tight esprit de corps is needed to keep desertions low and loyalty high.

Casualty rates are not published in Myanmar because they are considered a state secret. But leaked documents viewed by The Times, such as a tally of fallen soldiers in western Rakhine State a few years ago, indicate that hundreds of soldiers die each year, at a minimum.

The captain on active duty said it was common for unmarried soldiers to draw lots to marry the widow of one who died in battle. The woman, he said, has little choice about who her new husband will be.

“Most of the soldiers have been disconnected from the world, and for them the Tatmadaw is the only world,” he said.

Ethnic minorities, who make up roughly a third of Myanmar’s population, live in fear of the Tatmadaw, which has been accused by United Nations investigators of genocidal actions, including mass rapes and executions. Such campaigns have been unleashed most notoriously against Rohingya Muslims, but they have also targeted other ethnic groups, like the Karen, the Kachin and the Rakhine.

When the 77th Light Infantry Division was fighting in Shan State, in northeastern Myanmar, Captain Tun Myat Aung said he could feel the disgust of people from various ethnic groups. As a member of another ethnic minority, the Chin, he understood their fear of the Bamar majority.

Although he says he shot only to wound, not to kill, Captain Tun Myat Aung spent eight years on the front lines. He developed a rapport with just one group of ethnic minority villagers during that entire time, he said.

“People hate soldiers for what the soldiers did to them,” he said.

But the Tatmadaw also saved him. His mother died when he was His father drank. He was sent to a boarding school for ethnic minority students, where he excelled. At the Defense Services Academy, he studied physics and English.

“The military became my family,” he said. “I was automatically happy when I saw my soldier’s uniform.”

On Feb. 1, in the pre-dawn torpor of Yangon, Captain Tun Myat Aung clambered onto a military truck, half asleep, strapping on his helmet. He didn’t know what was going on until a fellow soldier whispered about a coup.

“At that moment, I felt like I lost hope for Myanmar,” he said.

Days later, he saw his major holding a box of bullets — real ones, not rubber. He cried that night.

“I realized,” he said, “that most of the soldiers see the people as the enemy.”

Sours: https://www.nytimes.com//03/28/world/asia/myanmar-army-protests.html
Myanmar Army - Tatmadaw - Myanmar Military Power 2016 - 2017

MAE SOT, Thailand - In Myanmar today, dozens of middle-aged generals are shedding their uniforms.

In the latest round of preparations for Myanmar's multi-party national elections on Nov. 7, senior military officers are resigning their commissions, ostensibly to make way for a new generation of military officers.

Prime Minister Thein Sein and 27 senior officers who are also government ministers have resigned from their military posts to form the military-controlled Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

The military is maneuvering to position itself for the elections, and no one should think this means it intends to give up its grip on Myanmar. The military has controlled Myanmar since a coup d'etat in They were trounced in the last elections held in , losing out to Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy.

The past 20 years has been a gradual process of rigging the next elections to ensure the right result and ensure continued military rule. The constitutional referendum of produced the unlikely result of 92 percent nationwide approval from a 98 percent voter turnout.

Even with other senior military officers offering themselves up as civilians, the military will still have reserved seats in the seat lower house of parliament and 56 in the upper house, with another 12 - in all - from each of Myanmar's 14 regions or states. So there will be serving officers at every level of supposed civilian, democratic elected assemblies.

But even for the seats not formally reserved for the military, there's no level electoral playing field. Significantly, President Than Shwe, a senior general, hasn't made the sartorial transformation: he has not retired from the military and remains commander in chief of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces). It is uncertain what role he will play in the post-election power structure, but he can and might assign himself one of the reserved seats for military officers and resume his presidency.

Look at which parties have fielded a full set of candidates. The military-controlled USDP, which has absorbed the resources of the 26 million-member social welfare organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), will field 1, candidates: every seat at every level. The National Unity Party, aligned with but not controlled by the army, a reformulation of the former ruling socialist party of the s and 80s, will field candidates.

The National Democratic Force (NDF), a splinter group of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, is fielding only candidates and even then the military-controlled Election Commission has forced some of its leaders out of the running. The Democratic Party of Myanmar, consisting of former activists, only has the resources and finances to field 49 candidates. Some ethnic parties may field candidates, but most only a handful, and some of those are actually pro-military government proxy parties.

The Electoral Commission has imposed a $ fee to register an individual candidate, a prohibitive cost in such a poor country, and there are tight restrictions on campaign activities, including what the parties can say in public and what they can say in print. There are potential prison terms if candidates insult the military, for example.

As for the military itself, some observers have suggested that the new generation of officers may be more willing to compromise with the Myanmar opposition and the international community. But this is wishful thinking. There is little basis to suggest the new generation will be any different than the current military leaders.

If nothing else, the military now holds all of the country's purse strings, and it has lucrative reasons for not letting go. Military officers have used their power to get their hands on much of the country's trade. And extraction of natural wealth, from natural gas, mining, forests and even illicit trade.

Think of the American historical sociologist Charles Tilly's famous dictum of "war making and state making as organized crime," and it's easy to understand the current generation of military officers for the past two decades. The long running civil war has been pushed back to isolated areas in the eastern and western borderlands, the economy has grown, trade with China and Thailand has boomed.

As opportunities for illegal or unfair graft are growing, Myanmar army officers, especially regional commanders, have been the arbiters of rackets from logging, narcotics, smuggling of gems, human trafficking and other lucrative enterprises. In short, the sign of likely advancement in the modern Tatmadaw is not just a proclivity for repression, but how well a general turns a profit.

It is wholly unlikely that a change of clothes will turn a general into a genial democrat. Economic incentives to repress Myanmar's people remain too strong, and without focused international pressure for reform, all the elections are likely to do is refine an existing system of repression.

There may yet be one windfall, and that's to the tailors and boutiques of Yangon, who may soon be deluged with orders from octogenarian strongmen seeking daywear for their new assignments.

David Scott Mathieson is a Senior Researcher in the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch.

Sours: https://www.hrw.org/news//10/30/burma-generals-new-clothes

Uniform myanmar army

Myanmar Army

"Burmese Army" redirects here. For other uses, see Burma Army (disambiguation).

Military unit

The Myanmar Army (Burmese: တပ်မတော်(ကြည်း), pronounced&#;[taʔmədɔ̀ tɕí]) is the largest branch of the Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) of Myanmar (Burma) and has the primary responsibility of conducting land-based military operations. The Myanmar Army maintains the second largest active force in Southeast Asia after the People's Army of Vietnam.

The Myanmar Army had a troop strength of around , as of [4] The army has extensive combat experience in fighting insurgents in rough terrain, considering it has been conducting non-stop counter-insurgency operations against ethnic and political insurgents since its inception in

The force is headed by the Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Army (ကာကွယ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်(ကြည်း)), currently Vice-Senior General Soe Win, concurrently Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services (ဒုတိယ တပ်မတော်ကာကွယ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်), with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing as the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (တပ်မတော်ကာကွယ်ရေးဦးစီးချုပ်). The highest rank in the Myanmar Army is Senior General, equivalent to field marshal in Western armies and is currently held by Min Aung Hlaing after being promoted from Vice-Senior General.

In , following a transition from military government to civilian parliamentary government, the Myanmar Army imposed a military draft on all citizens: all males from age 18 to 35 and all females from 18 to 27 years of age can be drafted into military service for two years as enlisted personnel in time of national emergency. The ages for professionals are up to 45 for men and 35 for women for three years service as commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

The Government Gazette reported that &#;trillion kyat (about US$2&#;billion), or percent of the budget was for military expenditures.[5]

Brief history[edit]

British and Japanese rule[edit]

In the late s, during the period of British rule, a few Myanmar organizations or parties formed an alliance named Burma's Htwet-Yet (Liberation) Group, one of them being Dobama Asiayone. Since most of the members were Communist, they wanted help from Chinese Communists; but when Tha-khin Aung San and a partner secretly went to China for help, they only met with a Japanese general and made an alliance with Japanese Army. In the early s, Aung San and other 29 participants secretly went for the military training under Japanese Army and these 30 people are later known as the 30 Soldiers in Myanmar history and can be regarded as the origin of modern Myanmar Army.

When the Japanese invasion of Burma was ready, the 30 Soldiers recruited Myanmar people in Thailand and founded Burmese Independence Army (BIA), which was the first phase of Myanmar Army. In , BIA assisted Japanese Army in their conquest of Burma, which succeeded. After that, Japanese Army changed BIA to Burmese Defense Army (BDA), which was the second phase. In , Japan officially declared Burma an independent nation, but the Burmese government did not possess the de facto rule over the country.

While assisting British Army in , Myanmar Army was in its third phase, which was the Patriotic Burmese Force (PBF), and the country became under British rule again. Afterwards, the structure of the army became under British authority; hence, for those who were willing to serve the nation but not in that army, General Aung San organized People's Comrade.

Post-Independence era[edit]

Myanmar Army Honour Guards saluting the arrival of the Thai delegation in October

At the time of Myanmar's independence in , the Tatmadaw was weak, small and disunited. Cracks appeared along the lines of ethnic background, political affiliation, organisational origin and different services. Its unity and operational efficiency was further weakened by the interference of civilians and politicians in military affairs, and the perception gap between the staff officers and field commanders. The most serious problem was the tension between ethnic Karen Officers, coming from the British Burma Army and Bamar officers, coming from the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF).[citation needed]

In accordance with the agreement reached at Kandy Conference in September , the Tatmadaw was reorganised by incorporating the British Burma Army and the Patriotic Burmese Forces. The officer corps shared by ex-PBF officers and officers from British Burma Army and Army of Burma Reserve Organisation (ARBO). The colonial government also decided to form what were known as "Class Battalions" based on ethnicity. There were a total of 15 rifle battalions at the time of independence and four of them were made up of former members of PBF. All influential positions within the War Office and commands were manned with non-former PBF Officers. All services including military engineers, supply and transport, ordnance and medical services, Navy and Air Force were all commanded by former officers from ABRO and British Burma Army.[citation needed]

Battalion Ethnic/Army composition
No. 1 Burma RiflesBamar (Burma Military Police)
No. 2 Burma RiflesKaren majority + other Non-Bamar Nationalities [commanded by then Lieutenant Colonel Saw Chit Khin [Karen officer from British Burma Army])
No. 3 Burma RiflesBamar / former members of Patriotic Burmese Forces
No. 4 Burma RiflesBamar / former members of Patriotic Burmese Force – Commanded by the then Lieutenant ColonelNe Win
No. 5 Burma RiflesBamar / former members of Patriotic Burmese Force
No. 6 Burma RiflesBamar / former members of Patriotic Burmese Force
No. 1 Karen RiflesKaren / former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 2 Karen RiflesKaren / former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 3 Karen RiflesKaren / former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 1 Kachin RiflesKachin / former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 2 Kachin RiflesKachin / former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 1 Chin RiflesChin / former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 2 Chin RiflesChin / former members of British Burma Army and ABRO
No. 4 Burma RegimentGurkha
Chin Hill BattalionChin

Formation and structure[edit]

The army has always been by far the largest service in Myanmar and has always received the lion's share of the defence budget.[6][7] It has played the most prominent part in Myanmar's struggle against the 40 or more insurgent groups since and acquired a reputation as a tough and resourceful military force. In , it was described as 'probably the best army in Southeast Asia, apart from Vietnam's'.[8] The judgement was echoed in , when another observer noted that "Myanmar's infantry is generally rated as one of the toughest, most combat seasoned in Southeast Asia".[9] In , a foreign journalist with the rare experience of seeing Burmese soldiers in action against ethnic insurgents and narco-armies was "thoroughly impressed by their fighting skills, endurance and discipline".[10] Other observers during that period characterised the Myanmar Army as "the toughest, most effective light infantry jungle force now operating in Southeast Asia".[11] Even the Thai people, not known to praise the Burmese lightly, have described the Myanmar Army as "skilled in the art of jungle warfare".[12]

Organisation[edit]

The Myanmar Army had reached some , active troops of all ranks in There were infantry battalions, including light infantry battalions as of Although the Myanmar Army's organisational structure was based upon the regimental system, the basic manoeuvre and fighting unit is the battalion, known as Tat Yinn ((တပ်ရင်း)) in Burmese. This is composed of a headquarters unit; five rifle companies Tat Khwe ((တပ်ခွဲ)) with three rifle platoons Tat Su ((တပ်စု)) each; an administrative company with medical, transport, logistics, and signals units; a heavy weapons company including mortar, machine gun, and recoilless gun platoons. Each battalion is commanded by a lieutenant colonel Du Ti Ya Bo Hmu Gyi or Du Bo Hmu Gyi with a major (bo hmu) as second in command, with a total strength of 27 officers and other ranks. Light infantry battalions in the Myanmar Army have much lower establishment strength of around ; this often leads to these units being mistakenly identified by observers as under-strength infantry battalions.

With its significantly increased personnel numbers, weaponry, and mobility, today's Tatmadaw Kyee (တပ်မတော်(ကြည်း)) is a formidable conventional defence force for the Union of Myanmar. Troops ready for combat duty have at least doubled since Logistics infrastructure and artillery fire support have been greatly increased. Its newly acquired military might was apparent in the Tatmadaw's dry season operations against Karen National Union (KNU) strongholds in Manerplaw and Kawmura. Most of the casualties at these battles were the result of intense and heavy bombardment by the Tatmadaw Kyee. The Tatmadaw Kyee is now much larger than it was before , it is more mobile and has greatly improved armour, artillery, and air defence inventories. Its C3I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) systems have been expanded and refined. It is developing larger and more integrated, self-sustained formations to improve coordinated action by different combat arms. The army may still have relatively modest weaponry compared to its larger neighbours, but it is now in a much better position to deter external aggression and respond to such a threat should it ever arise, although child soldiers may not perform very well in combating with enemies.[13]

Expansion[edit]

The first army division to be formed after the military coup was the 11th Light Infantry Division (LID) in December with Colonel Win Myint as commander. In March , a new regional military command was created in Monywa with Brigadier Kyaw Min as commander and named the North-Western Regional Military Command. A year later, st LID was formed in Pakokku with Colonel Saw Tun as commander. Two Regional Operations Commands (ROC) were formed in Myeik and Loikaw to improve command and control. They were commanded respectively by Brigadier Soe Tint and Brigadier Maung Kyi. March saw a dramatic expansion of the Tatmadaw as it established 11 Military Operations Commands (MOC)s in that month. MOC are similar to mechanised infantry divisions in Western armies, each with 10 regular infantry battalions (Chay Hlyin Tatyin), a headquarters, and organic support units including field artillery. In , two new RMC were opened, Coastal Region RMC was opened in Myeik with Brigadier Sit Maung as commander and Triangle Region RMC in Kengtung with Brigadier Thein Sein as commander. Three new ROCs were created in Kalay, Bhamo and Mongsat. In late , two new MOCs were created in Bokepyin and Mongsat.[14]

The most significant expansion after the infantry in the army was in armour and artillery. Beginning in , the Tatmadaw procured 18 TIImain battle tanks and 48 T amphibious light tanks from China. Further procurements were made, including several hundred Type 85 and Type 92armoured personnel carriers (APC). By the beginning of , Tatmadaw had about TII main battle tanks, a similar number of T amphibious light tanks, and several TD tanks. These tanks and armoured personnel carriers were distributed throughout five armoured infantry battalions and five tank battalions and formed the first armoured division of the Tatmadaw as the 71st Armoured Operations Command with its headquarters in Pyawbwe.

Bureau of Special Operations (BSO)[edit]

Bureau of Special Operations
Regional Military Commands (RMC)

The Bureau of Special Operations (ကာကွယ်ရေးဌာန စစ်ဆင်ရေး အထူးအဖွဲ့) in the Myanmar Army are high-level field units equivalent to field armies in Western terms and consist of two or more regional military commands (RMC) commanded by a lieutenant general and six staff officers.

The units were introduced under the General Staff Office on 28 April and 1 June In early , the Chairman of BSPP, General Ne Win, visited the North Eastern Command Headquarters in Lashio to receive a briefing about Burmese Communist Party (BCP) insurgents and their military operations. He was accompanied by Brigadier General Tun Ye from the Ministry of Defence. Brigadier General Tun Ye was the regional commander of the Eastern Command for three years and before that he served in North Eastern Command areas as commander of Strategic Operation Command (SOC) and commander of Light Infantry Divisions for four years. As BCP military operations were spread across three Regional Military Command (RMC) areas (Northern, Eastern, and North Eastern), Brigadier General Tun Ye was the most informed commander about the BCP in the Myanmar Army at the time. At the briefing, General Ne Win was impressed by Brigadier General Tun Ye and realised that co-ordination among various Regional Military Commands (RMC) was necessary; thus, decided to form a bureau at the Ministry of Defence.

Originally, the bureau was for "special operations", wherever they were, that needed co-ordination among various Regional Military Commands (RMC). Later, with the introduction of another bureau, there was a division of command areas. The BSO-1 was to oversee the operations under the Northern Command, North Eastern Command, the Eastern Command, and the North Western Command. BSO-2 was to oversee operations under the South Eastern Command, South Western Command, Western Command and Central Command.

Initially, the chief of the BSO had the rank of brigadier general. The rank was upgraded to major general on 23 April In , it was further upgraded to lieutenant general. Between and , Chief of Staff (Army) jointly held the position of Chief of BSO. However, in early , two more BSO were added to the General Staff Office; therefore there were altogether four BSOs. The fifth BSO was established in and the sixth in

Currently there are six Bureaus of Special Operations in the Myanmar order of battle.[15]

Bureau of Special Operations Regional Military Commands (RMC) Chief of Bureau of Special Operations Notes
Bureau of Special Operations 1 Central Command
North Western Command
Northern Command
Lt. Gen. Tay Zar Kyaw
Bureau of Special Operations 2 North Eastern Command
Eastern Command
Triangle Region Command
Eastern Central Command
Lt. Gen. Than Tun Oo
Bureau of Special Operations 3 South Western Command
Southern Command
Western Command
Lt. Gen. Win Bo Shein
Bureau of Special Operations 4 Coastal Command
South Eastern Command
Lt. Gen. Aung Soe
Bureau of Special Operations 5 Yangon Command Lt. Gen. Thet Pone
Bureau of Special Operations 6 Naypyidaw Command Lt. Gen. Moe Myint Tun

Regional Military Commands (RMC)[edit]

For better command and communication, the Tatmadaw formed a Regional Military Commands (တိုင်း စစ်ဌာနချုပ်) structure in Until , there were only two regional commands, they were supported by 13 infantry brigades and an infantry division. In October , new regional military commands were opened and leaving only two independent infantry brigades. In June , the Naypyidaw Command was temporarily formed in Yangon with the deputy commander and some staff officers drawn from Central Command. It was reorganised and renamed as Yangon Command on 1 June [citation needed]

A total of infantry and light infantry battalions organised in Tactical Operations Commands, 37 independent field artillery regiments supported by affiliated support units including armoured reconnaissance and tank battalions. RMCs are similar to corps formations in Western armies. The RMCs, commanded by major general, are managed through a framework of Bureau of Special Operations (BSOs), which are equivalent to field army group in Western terms.[citation needed]

Regional Military Command (RMC) Badge States & Divisions Headquarters Strength
Northern Command

(မြောက်ပိုင်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-northern-rmc.svgKachin StateMyitkyina32 Infantry Battalions
North Eastern Command

(အရှေ့မြောက်ပိုင်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-north-eastern-rmc.svgNorthern Shan StateLashio30 Infantry Battalions
Eastern Command

(အရှေ့ပိုင်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-eastern-rmc.svgSouthern Shan State and Kayah StateTaunggyi42 Infantry Battalions
including 16× Light Infantry Battalions under
Regional Operation Command (ROC) Headquarters at Loikaw
South Eastern Command

(အရှေ့တောင်တိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-south-eastern-rmc.svgMon State and Kayin StateMawlamyine40 × Infantry Battalions
Southern Command

(တောင်ပိုင်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-southern-rmc.svgBago and Magwe Divisions Toungoo27 × Infantry Battalions
Western Command

(အနောက်ပိုင်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Rakhine State and Chin StateAnn31 × Infantry Battalions
South Western Command

(အနောက်တောင်တိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-south-western-rmc.svgAyeyarwady Division (Irrawaddy Division) Pathein (Bassein) 11 × Infantry Battalions
North Western Command

(အနောက်မြောက်တိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-north-western-rmc.svgSagaing DivisionMonywa25 × Infantry Battalions
Yangon Command

(ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-yangon-rmc.svgYangon DivisionMayangone Township-Kone-Myint-Thar 11 × Infantry Battalions
Coastal Region Command

(ကမ်းရိုးတန်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-coastal-rmc.svgTanintharyi Division (Tenassarim Division) Myeik (Mergui) 43 Infantry Battalions
including battalions under 2 MOC based at Tavoy
Triangle Region Command

(တြိဂံတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-triangle-rmc.svgEastern Shan StateKyaingtong (Kengtung) 23 Infantry Battalions
Central Command

(အလယ်ပိုင်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-central-rmc.svgMandalay DivisionMandalay31 Infantry Battalions
Naypyidaw Command

(နေပြည်တော်တိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Mm-armysvgNaypyidawPyinmanaFormed in –&#;? × Infantry Battalions
Eastern Central Command

(အရှေ့အလယ်ပိုင်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်)

Eastern Central Command.pngMiddle Shan StateNamsangFormed in – 7 × Infantry Battalions

Commanders of Regional Military Commands[edit]

Regional Military Command (RMC) Established First Commander Current Commander Notes
Eastern CommandBrigadier General San YuMajor General Lin AungInitially in , San Yu was appointed as Commander of Eastern Command but was moved to NW Command and replaced with Col. Maung Shwe then.
South Eastern CommandBrigadier General Sein WinMajor General Ko Ko MaungIn when SE Command was formed, Sein Win was transferred from former Southern Command but was moved to Central Command and replaced with Thaung Kyi then.
Central CommandColonel Thaung KyiMajor General Ko Ko OoOriginal NW Command based at Mandalay was renamed Central Command in March and original Central Command was renamed Southern Command
North Western CommandBrigadier General Kyaw MinMajor General Myo Moe AungSouthern part of original North western Command in Mandalay was renamed Central Command in March and northern part of original NW Command was renamed NW Command in
South Western CommandColonel Kyi MaungMajor General Aung AungKyi Maung was sacked in and was imprisoned a few times. He became Deputy Chairman of NLD in the s.
Yangon CommandColonel Thura Kyaw HtinMajor General Nyunt Win SweFormed as Naypyidaw Command in with deputy commander and some staff officers from Central Command. Reformed and renamed Yangon Command on 1 June
Western CommandColonel Hla TunMajor General Htin Latt Oo
North Eastern CommandColonel Aye KoMajor General Aung Zaw Aye
Northern CommandBrigadier Ne WinMajor GeneralOriginal Northern Command was divided into Eastern Command and NW Command in Current Northern Command was formed in as a part of reorganisation and is formed northern part of previous NW Command
Southern CommandBrigadier Saw Kya DoeMajor General Myo WinOriginal Southern Command in Mandalay was renamed Central Command in March
Triangle Region CommandBrigadier General Thein SeinMajor General Khin HlaingThein Sein later became Prime Minister and elected as president in
Coastal Region CommandBrigadier General Thiha Thura Thura Sit MaungMajor General Saw Than Hlaing
Naypyidaw CommandBrigadier Wei LwinMajor General Zaw Myo Tin
Eastern Central CommandBrigadier Mya Tun OoMajor General Vacant

Regional Operations Commands (ROC)[edit]

Regional Operations Commands (ROC) (ဒေသကွပ်ကဲမှု စစ်ဌာနချုပ်) are commanded by a brigadier general, are similar to infantry brigades in Western Armies. Each consists of 4 Infantry battalions (Chay Hlyin Tatyin), HQ and organic support units. Commander of ROC is a position between LID/MOC commander and tactical Operation Command (TOC) commander, who commands three infantry battalions. The ROC commander holds financial, administrative and judicial authority while the MOC and LID commanders do not have judicial authority.[7][16]

Regional Operation Command (ROC) Headquarters Notes
Loikaw Regional Operations CommandLoikaw (လွိုင်ကော်) Kayah State
Laukkai Regional Operations CommandLaukkai (လောက်ကိုင်), Shan State
Kalay Regional Operations CommandKalay (ကလေး), Sagaing Division
Sittwe Regional Operations CommandSittwe (စစ်တွေ), Yakhine State
Pyay Regional Operations CommandPyay (ပြည်), Bago Division
Tanaing Regional Operations CommandTanaing (တနိုင်း), Kachin StateFormerly ROC Bhamo
Wanhseng Regional Operations CommandWanhseng, Shan StateFormed in [17]

Military Operations Commands (MOC)[edit]

Military Operations Commands (MOC) (စစ်ဆင်ရေးကွပ်ကဲမှုဌာနချုပ်), commanded by a brigadier-general are similar to Infantry Divisions in Western Armies. Each consists of 10 Mechanised Infantry battalions equipped with BTR-3 armoured personnel carriers, Headquarters and support units including field artillery batteries. These ten battalions are organised into three Tactical Operations Commands: one Mechanised Tactical Operations Command with BTR-3 armoured personnel carriers, and two Motorized Tactical Operations Command with EQ 6x6 trucks.

MOC are equivalent to Light Infantry Divisions (LID) in the Myanmar Army order of battle as both command 10 infantry battalions through three TOC's (Tactical Operations Commands). However, unlike Light Infantry Divisions, MOC are subordinate to their respective Regional Military Command (RMC) Headquarters.[16] Members of MOC does not wear distinguished arm insignias and instead uses their respective RMC's arm insignias. For example, MOC in Kawthaung wore the arm insignia of Costal Region Military Command.

Military Operation Command (MOC) Headquarters Notes
1st Military Operations Command (MOC-1)Kyaukme, Shan State
2nd Military Operations Command (MOC-2)Mong Nawng, Shan State
3rd Military Operations Command (MOC-3)Mogaung, Kachin State
4th Military Operations Command (MOC-4)Hpugyi, Yangon RegionDesignated Airborne Division
5th Military Operations Command (MOC-5)Taungup, Rakhine State
6th Military Operations Command (MOC-6)Pyinmana (ပျဉ်းမနား), Mandalay Region
7th Military Operations Command (MOC-7)Hpegon (ဖယ်ခုံ), Shan State
8th Military Operations Command (MOC-8)Dawei (ထားဝယ်), Tanintharyi Region
9th Military Operations Command (MOC-9)Kyauktaw (ကျောက်တော်), Rakhine State
10th Military Operations Command (MOC)Kyigon (ကျီကုန်း (ကလေးဝ)), Sagaing Region
11th Military Operations Command (MOC)
12th Military Operations Command (MOC)Kawkareik (ကော့ကရိတ်), Kayin State
13th Military Operations Command (MOC)Bokpyin (ဘုတ်ပြင်း), Tanintharyi Region
14th Military Operations Command (MOC)Mong Hsat (မိုင်းဆတ်), Shan State
15th Military Operations Command (MOC)Buthidaung (ဘူးသီးတောင်), Rakhine State
16th Military Operations Command (MOC)Theinni (သိန်းနီ), Shan State
17th Military Operations Command (MOC)Mong Pan (မိုင်းပန်), Shan State
18th Military Operations Command (MOC)Mong Hpayak (မိုင်းပေါက်), Shan State
19th Military Operations Command (MOC)Ye (ရေး), Mon State
20th Military Operations Command (MOC)Kawthaung (ကော့သောင်း), Tanintharyi Region
21st Military Operations Command (MOC)Bhamo (ဗန်းမော်), Kachin State

Light Infantry Divisions (LID)[edit]

Light Infantry Division (Chay Myan Tat Ma or Ta Ma Kha), commanded by a brigadier general, each with 10 Light Infantry Battalions organised under 3 Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a Colonel (3 battalions each and 1 reserve), 1 Field Artillery Battalion, 1 Armour Squadron and other support units.[7][16]

These divisions were first introduced to the Myanmar Army in as rapid reaction mobile forces for strike operations. 77th Light Infantry Division was formed on 6 June , followed by 88th Light Infantry Division and 99th Light Infantry Division in the two following years. 77th LID was largely responsible for the defeat of the Communist forces of the CPB (Communist Party of Burma) based in the forested hills of the central Bago Mountains in the mids. Three more LIDs were raised in the latter half of the s (the 66th, 55th and 44th) with their headquarters at Pyay, Aungban and Thaton. They were followed by another two LIDs in the period prior to the military coup (the 33rd LID with headquarters at Sagaing and the 22nd LID with headquarters at Hpa-An). 11th LID was formed in December with headquarters at Inndine, Bago Division and st LID was formed in with its headquarters at Pakokku.[7][16]

Each LID, commanded by Brigadier General (Bo hmu gyoke) level officers, consists of 10 light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, "search and destroy" operations against ethnic insurgents and narcotics-based armies. These battalions are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands (TOC; Nee byu har). Each TOC, commanded by a Colonel (Bo hmu gyi), is made up of three or more combat battalions, with command and support elements similar to that of brigades in Western armies. One infantry battalion is held in reserve. As of , all LIDs have their own organic Field Artillery units. For example, th Field Artillery Battery is now attached to 44th LID. Some of the LID battalions have been given Parachute and Air Borne Operations training and two of the LIDs have been converted to mechanised infantry formation with divisional artillery, armoured reconnaissance and tank battalions[7]

LIDs are considered to be a strategic asset of the Myanmar Army, and after the reorganisation and restructuring of the Tatmadaw command structure, they are now directly answerable to Chief of Staff (Army).[7][16]

Light Infantry Division (LID) Badge Year formed Headquarters First commander Current commander Notes
11th Light Infantry Division
11th Light Infantry Division
InndineCol. Win MyintFormed after military coup.
22nd Light Infantry Division
22nd Light Infantry Division
Hpa-AnCol. Tin HlaInvolved in crackdown of unarmed protestors during democracy uprising
33rd Light Infantry Division
33rd Light Infantry Division
Mandalay/later SagaingCol. Kyaw BaInvolved in crackdown against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state[18]

Involved in the Kachin conflict

44th Light Infantry DivisionThatonCol. Myat Thin
55th Light Infantry DivisionSagaing/later KalawCol. Phone Myint
66th Light Infantry DivisionInnmaCol. Taung Zar Khaing
77th Light Infantry DivisionHmawbi/later BagoCol. Tint Swe
88th Light Infantry DivisionMagwayCol. Than Tin
99th Light Infantry DivisionMeiktilaCol. Kyaw HtinInvolved in crackdown against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state[18]
st Light Infantry Division
st Light Infantry Division
PakokkuCol. Saw TunUnits of st LID were deployed during the purge of Military Intelligence faction in

Missile, Artillery and armoured units[edit]

Missile, Artillery and armoured units were not used in an independent role, but were deployed in support of the infantry by the Ministry of Defence as required. The Directorate of Artillery and Armour Corps was also divided into separate corps in The Directorate of Artillery and Missile Corps was also divided into separate corps in A dramatic expansion of forces under these directorates followed with the equipment procured from China, Russia, Ukraine and India.[7][16]

Directorate of Missiles[edit]

No(1) Missile Operational Command MOC(1)[edit]

Directorate of Artillery[edit]

th Artillery Operation Command

No. 1 Artillery Battalion was formed in with three artillery batteries under the Directorate of Artillery Corps. A further three artillery battalions were formed in the late This formation remained unchanged until Since , the Directorate of Artillery Corps has overseen the expansion of Artillery Operations Commands(AOC) from two to Tatmadaw's stated intention is to establish an organic Artillery Operations Command in each of the 12 Regional Military Command Headquarters. Each Artillery Operation Command is composed of the following:[citation needed]

As of , the Artillery wing of the Tatmadaw has about 60 battalions and 37 independent Artillery companies/batteries attached to various Regional Military Commands (RMC), Light Infantry Divisions (LID), Military Operation Command (MOC) and Regional Operation Command (ROC). For example, th Artillery Battery is under 44th LID, Artillery Battery is attached to 5th MOC, Artillery Battery is under the command of ROC (Bhamo) and Artillery Battery is under North-Eastern RMC. Twenty of these Artillery battalions are grouped under th Artillery Operation Command (AOC) headquarters in Kyaukpadaung and th Artillery Operation Command (AOC) headquarters in Oaktwin, near Taungoo. The remaining 30 battalions, including 7 Anti-Aircraft artillery battalions are under the Directorate of Artillery Corps.[7][16]

Artillery Operations Command (AOC)[edit]

  • HQ battalion
  • 12 Artillery battalions:
    • 6 Light Field artillery battalion equipped with &#;mm, 76&#;mm, 75&#;mmhowitzers, field guns and mountain guns,
    • 3 Medium Field Artillery battalion equipped with &#;mm, &#;mm, &#;mm howitzers and field guns,
    • 1 Multiple Rocket Launcher battalion equipped with &#;mm and &#;mm MLRS, self-propelled and towed launchers,
    • 1 Air Defence Artillery battalion with 37&#;mm, 57&#;mm Anti-Aircraft guns or SA 18 IGLAs) man portable surface-to-air missiles and
    • 1 target acquisition battalion.
  • support units

Light field artillery battalions consists of 3 field artillery batteries with 36 field guns or howitzers (12 guns per battery). Medium artillery battalions consists of 3 medium artillery batteries of 18 field guns or howitzers (6 guns per one battery).[citation needed] As of , all field guns of Myanmar Artillery Corps are undergoing upgrade programs including GPS Fire Control Systems.

Artillery Operations Command (AOC) Headquarters Notes
th Artillery Operations CommandMyeik (မြိတ်)
th Artillery Operations CommandKyaukpadaung (ကျောက်ပန်းတောင်း)
th Artillery Operations CommandThaton (သထုံ)
th Artillery Operations CommandOak Twinn (အုပ်တွင်းမြို့)
th Artillery Operations CommandMong Khon--Kengtung
st Artillery Operations CommandBaw Net Gyi (ဘောနက်ကြီး--ပဲခူးတိုင်း)
nd Artillery Operations Command[NAUNG HKIO)
rd Artillery Operations Command[AUNG BAN)
th Artillery Operations CommandMohnyin (မိုးညှင်း)
th Artillery Operations CommandPadein--Ngape

Directorate of Armour[edit]

No. 1 Armour Company and No. 2 Armour Company were formed in July under the Directorate of Armour and Artillery Corps with Sherman tanks, Stuart light tanks, Humber Scout Cars, Ferret armoured cars and Universal Bren Carriers. These two companies were merged on 1 November to become No. 1 Armour Battalion with headquarters in Mingalardon. On 15 May No. Tank Battalion was formed with 25 Comet tanks acquired from the United Kingdom. The Armour Corps within Myanmar Army was the most neglected one for nearly thirty years since the Tatmadaw had not procured any new tanks or armoured carriers since [citation needed]

Armoured divisions, known as Armoured Operations Command (AROC), under the command of Directorate of Armour Corps, were also expanded in number from one to two, each with four Armoured Combat battalions equipped with Infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, three tank battalions equipped with main battle tanks and three Tank battalions equipped with light tanks. [16] In mid, Tamadaw acquired + Tmain battle tanks from Ukraine and signed a contract to build and equip a factory in Myanmar to produce and assemble 1, BTR armoured personnel carriers in [19] In , the Government of India transferred an unspecified number of T main battle tanks that were being phased out from active service to Tatmadaw along with &#;mm light field guns, armoured personnel carriers and indigenous HAL Light Combat Helicopters in return for Tatmadaw's support and co-operation in flushing out Indian insurgent groups operating from its soil.[20]

Armoured Operations Command (AROC)[edit]

Armoured Operations Commands (AROC) are equivalent to Independent armoured divisions in western terms. Currently there are 5 Armoured Operations Commands under Directorate of Armoured Corps in the Tatmadaw order of battle. Tatmadaw planned to establish an AROC each in 7 Regional Military Commands.[citation needed] Typical armoured divisions in the Myanmar Army are composed of Headquarters, Three Armored Tactical Operations Command – each with one mechanised infantry battalion equipped with 44 BMP-1 or MAV-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Two Tank Battalions equipped with 44 main battle tanks each, one armoured reconnaissance battalion equipped with 32 TypeA Amphibious Light Tanks, one field artillery battalion and a support battalion. The support battalion is composed of an engineersquadron, two logistic squadrons, and a signal company.[citation needed]

The Myanmar Army acquired about refurbished EE-9 Cascavelarmoured cars from an Israeli firm in [21] Classified in the army's service as a light tank, the Cascavel is currently deployed in the eastern Shan State and triangle regions near the Thai border.

Armoured Operations Command (ArOC) Headquarters Notes
71st Armoured Operations CommandPyawbwe (ပျော်ဘွယ်)
72nd Armoured Operations Command(အုန်းတော)
73rd Armoured Operations Command(မလွန်)
74th Armoured Operations Command(အင်းတိုင်)
75th Armoured Operations Command(သာဂရ)

Office of the Chief of Air Defence[edit]

Main article: Office of the Chief of Air Defence (Myanmar)

The Office of the chief of Air Defence (လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့အရာရှိချုပ်ရုံး) is one of the major branches of Tatmadaw. It was established as the Air Defence Command in , but was not fully operational until late It was renamed the Bureau of Air Defence in the early s. In early , Tatmadaw established the Myanmar Integrated Air Defence System (MIADS) (မြန်မာ့အလွှာစုံပေါင်းစပ်လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးစနစ်) with help from Russia and China. It is a tri-service bureau with units from all three branches of the armed forces. All air defence assets except anti-aircraft artillery are integrated into MIADS.[22]

Directorate of Signal[edit]

Soon after the independence in , Myanmar Signal Corps was formed with units from Burma Signals, also known as "X" Branch. It consisted HQ Burma Signals, Burma Signal Training Squadron (BSTS) and Burma Signals Squadron. HQ Burma Signals was located within War Office. BSTS based in Pyain Oo Lwin was formed with Operating Cipher Training Troop, Dispacth Rider Training Troop, Lineman Training Troop, Radio Mechanic Training Troop and Regimental Signals Training Troop. BSS, based in Mingalardon, had nine sections: Administration Troop, Maintenance Troop, Operating Troop, Cipher Troop, Lineman and Dispatch Rider Troop, NBSD Signals Troop, SBSD Signals Troop, Mobile Brigade Signals Toop and Arakan Signals Toop. The then Chief of Signal Staff Officer (CSO) was Lieutenant Colonel Saw Aung Din. BSTS and BSS were later renamed No. 1 Signal Battalion and No.1 Signal Training Battalion. In , the Infantry Divisional Signals Regiment was formed and later renamed to No. 2 Signal Battalion. HQ Burma Signals was reorganised and became Directorate Signal and the director was elevated to the rank of Colonel. In , No. 1 Signal Security Battalion was formed, followed by No. 3 Signal Battalion in November and No.4 Signal Battalion in October

In , signal battalions were reorganised as No. 11 Signal Battalion under North Eastern Regional Military Command, No. Signal Battalion under Eastern Command, No. Signal Battalion under Central Command, No Signal Battalion under South Western Command, and No. Signal Battalion under South Eastern Command. No.1 Signal Training Battalion was renamed Burma Signal Training Depot (Baho-Setthweye-Tat).

By , Directorate of Signals command one training depot, eight signal battalions, one signal security battalion, one signal store depot and two signal workshops. Signal Corps under Directorate of Signal further expanded during expansion and reorganisation of Myanmar Armed Forces. By , a signal battalion is attached to each Regional Military Command and signal companies are now attached to Light Infantry Divisions and Military Operations Commands.

In , Command, Control and Communication system of Myanmar Army has been substantially upgraded by setting up the military fibre optic communication network managed by Directorate of Signal throughout the country. Since all Myanmar Army Regional Military Command HQs used its own telecommunication system. Satellite communication links are also provided to forward-deployed infantry battalions. However, battle field communication systems are still poor. Infantry units are still using TRA and PRM which were acquired from UK in the s. Myanmar Army also uses the locally built TRA Thura and Chinese XD-D6M radio sets. Frequency hopping handsets are fitted to all front line units.[23]

Between and , Myanmar army bought 50 units of Brett Advanced Tech radio set from Australia through third party from Singapore. Those units are distributed to ROCs in central & upper regions to use in counterinsurgency operations.[16]

Directorate of Medical Services[edit]

Main article: Directorate of Medical Services

At the time of independence in , the medical corps has two Base Military Hospitals, each with beds, in Mingalardon and Pyin Oo Lwin, a Medical Store Depot in Yangon, a Dental Unit and six Camp Reception Stations located in Myitkyina, Sittwe, Taungoo, Pyinmana, Bago and Meikhtila. Between and , the medical corps was restructured and all Camp Reception Stations were reorganised into Medical Battalions.

In , Directorate of Medical Services has significantly expanded along with the infantry. In , there are two 1,bed Defence Services General Hospitals (Mingalardon and Naypyitaw), two bed hospitals in Pyin Oo Lwin and Aung Ban, two bed military hospitals in Meikhtila and Yangon, one bed Defence Services Orthopedic Hospital in Mingalardon, two bed Defence Services Obstetric, Gynecological and Children hospitals (Mingalardon and Naypyitaw), three bed Military Hospitals (Myitkyina, Ann and Kengtung), eighteen bed Military Hospitals (Mongphyet, Baan, Indaing, Bahtoo, Myeik, Pyay, Loikaw, Namsam, Lashio, Kalay, Mongsat, Dawai, Kawthaung, Laukai, Thandaung, Magway, Sittwe, and Hommalin), fourteen field medical battalions, which are attached to various Regional Military Commands throughout the country. Each Field Medical Battalion consist of 3 Field Medical Companies with 3 Field Hospital Units and a specialist team each. Health & Disease Control Unit (HDCU) is responsible for prevention, control & eradication of diseases.

Units Headquarter RMC
Medical Corps CentreHmawbiYangon Command
No.(1) Field Medical BattalionMandalayCentral Command
No.(2) Field Medical BattalionTaunggyiEastern Command
No.(3) Field Medical BattalionTaungooSouthern Command
No.(4) Field Medical BattalionPatheinSouth Western Command
No.(5) Field Medical BattalionMawlamyaingSouth Eastern Command
No.(6) Field Medical BattalionHmawbiYangon Command
No.(7) Field Medical BattalionMonywaNorth Western Command
No.(8) Field Medical BattalionSittweWestern Command
No.(9) Field Medical BattalionMohnyinNorthern Command
No.(10) Field Medical BattalionLashioNorth Eastern Command
No.(11) Field Medical BattalionBhamoNorthern Command
No.(12) Field Medical BattalionKengtungTriangle Region Command
No.(13) Field Medical BattalionMyeikCoastal Region Command
No.(14) Field Medical BattalionTaikkyiYangon Command
Health and Disease Control UnitMingaladonYangon Command

Training[edit]

Main article: Military Training in Myanmar

[7][16]

Defence academies and colleges[edit]

Training schools[edit]

Badge Training Schools Locations
Officer Training School – OTSFort Ba Htoo
Basic Army Combat Training SchoolFort Ba Htoo
1st Army Combat Forces SchoolFort Ba Htoo
2nd Army Combat Forces SchoolFort Bayinnaung
Artillery Training SchoolMone Tai
Armour Training SchoolMaing Maw
Electronic Warfare SchoolPyin U Lwin
Engineer SchoolPyin U Lwin
Information Warfare SchoolYangon
Air, Land and Paratroops Training SchoolHmawbi
Special Forces SchoolFort Ye Mon

Ranks and insignia[edit]

Main article: Military ranks of Myanmar

Commissioned officer ranks[edit]

The rank insignia of commissioned officers.

Other ranks[edit]

The rank insignia of non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.

Order of battle[edit]

[16]

  • 14 x Regional Military Commands (RMC) organised in 6 Bureau of Special Operations (BSO)
  • 6 x Regional Operations Commands (ROC)
  • 20 × Military Operations Commands (MOC) including 1 x Airborne Infantry Division
  • 10 x Light Infantry Divisions (LID)
  • 5 x Armoured Operation Commands (AOC) (Each with 6 Tank Battalions and 4 Armoured Infantry Battalions (IFVs/APCs).)
  • 10 x Artillery Operation Commands (AOC) (with of Field Artillery Battalions)
  • 9 x Air Defence Operation Commands
  • 1 x Missile Operation Commands
  • 40+ Military Affair Security Companies (MAS Units replaces former Military Intelligence Units after the disbandment of the Directorate of Defence Service Intelligence (DDSI))
  • 45 Advanced Signal Battalions
  • 54 Field Engineer Battalions
  • 4 Armoured Engineer Battalions
  • 14 Medical Battalions

Equipment[edit]

See also: List of equipment of the Myanmar Army

Gallery[edit]

  • TS main battle tank of Myanmar Army

  • Locally made MMT light tank with mm gun

  • Licence-built Thunder armoured personnel carrier of Myanmar Army

  • PTL(WMA) tank destroyers of Myanmar Army

  • Panhard AML 90 of Myanmar Army

  • TypeARV(ZSL) armoured recovery vehicle of Myanmar Army

  • GSL mine clearance vehicle of Myanmar Army

  • Naung Yoe (Humvee version) light armoured vehicle of Myanmar Army

  • BAAC armoured personnel carrier of Myanmar Army

  • MAV-2 armoured personnel carrier of Myanmar Army

  • 25mm Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns of Myanmar Army

  • SH-1 self-propelled artillery systems of Myanmar Army

  • SH-1 self-propelled artillery systems of Myanmar Army

  • Nora B52 self-propelled artillery system of Myanmar Army

  • Upgraded 9P "Grad-1" rocket artillery system of Myanmar Army

  • Type rocket artillery system of Myanmar Army

  • MAMB rocket artillery systems of Myanmar Army

  • MAM01(Early Version) rocket artillery system of Myanmar Army

  • MAM(Upgraded Version) rocket artillery system of Myanmar Army

  • Production of MAM rocket artillery systems by Myanmar Army

  • MAM MLRS which is being prepared to fire.

  • M rocket artillery system of Myanmar Army

  • MAM mm multiple launch rocket systems of Myanmar Army at the Armed Force Day Parade,

  • GYD-1B(KS-1M) missile production facility of Myanmar Army

  • GYD-1B(KS-1M) missile production facility of Myanmar Army

  • MADV self-propelled short range air defence system of Myanmar Army

  • 2K22M Tunguska air defence system of Myanmar Army

  • SM3 Volga-2 air defence system of Myanmar Army

  • Kub 2K12M2 air defence system of Myanmar Army

  • 1S91 "Straight Flush" radar of Myanmar Army

  • Kavadat-M air defence systems of Myanmar Army

  • Pechora-2M air defence systems of Myanmar Army

  • KS-1B air defence system of Myanmar Army

  • KS-1M SAM of Myanmar Army

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^The International The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); International Institute of Strategic Studies (24 January ). The Military Balance . Routledge. pp.&#;– ISBN&#;. Retrieved 12 May
  2. ^"Border Guard Force Scheme". Myanmar Peace Monitor.
  3. ^Maung Zaw (18 March ). "Taint of still lingers for rebooted student militia". Myanmar Times.
  4. ^The Asian Conventional Military Balance (PDF), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 June , p.&#;4, archived(PDF) from the original on 29 April , retrieved 20 March
  5. ^"Myanmar allocates 1/4 of new budget to military". Associated Press. 1 March Archived from the original on 28 June Retrieved 9 March [dead link]
  6. ^Working Papers – Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
  7. ^ abcdefghiSelth, Andrew (): Burma's Armed Forces: Power Without Glory, Eastbridge. ISBN&#;
  8. ^Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 May
  9. ^FEER, 7 July
  10. ^Bertil Lintner, Land of Jade
  11. ^Asiaweek 21 February
  12. ^The Defence of Thailand (Thai Government issue), p, April
  13. ^"Myanmar's losing military strategy". Asia Times. 7 October Archived from the original on 13 May Retrieved 28 July CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
  14. ^WP Australian National University
  15. ^"Myanmar-Army Regional Military Commands". Global Security. GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 23 September
  16. ^ abcdefghijkMyoe, Maung Aung: Building the tatmadaw – Myanmar Armed Forces Since , Institute of SouthEast Asian Studies. ISBN&#;
  17. ^"Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2 March Retrieved 6 March CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  18. ^ ab"How Myanmar's shock troops led the assault that expelled the Rohingya". Reuters. Archived from the original on 17 July Retrieved 28 August
  19. ^"Archived copy". Archived from the original on 5 June Retrieved 13 September CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  20. ^"Defense19". Archived from the original on 24 September Retrieved 29 November
  21. ^"Why Russia". Archived from the original on 5 December Retrieved 12 March CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
  22. ^IndraStra Global Editorial Team (30 October ). "Myanmar Integrated Air Defense System". Archived from the original on 31 October Retrieved 7 December
  23. ^"Burmanet " Jane's Intelligence Review: Radio active – Desmond Ball and Samuel Blythe". Archived from the original on 6 December Retrieved 29 November

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]

Sours: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar_Army
Myanmar Army Infantry Operation ျမန္မာ့တပ္မေတာ္(ျကည္း_စစ္ဆင္ေရး)

.

Similar news:

.



827 828 829 830 831